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I. Parallel Proceedings: Treading Carefully
LOUISE ELLEN TErrz**
The basic principle is that each jurisdiction is independent. There is therefore ... no embargo
on concurrent proceedings in the same matter in more than one jurisdiction. There are simply
these two weapons: a stay (or dismissal) of proceedings and an antisuit injunction. Moreover,
each of these has its limitations. The former depends on its voluntary adoption by the state
in question, and the latter is inhibited by respect for comity. It follows that, although the
availability of these two weapons should ensure that practical justice is achieved in most cases,
this may not always be possible.'
Parallel proceedings in more than one country is an increasing problem in international
litigation resulting from a myriad of causes, induding concurrent jurisdiction and the differences
in procedural systems that encourage forum shopping.2 There are three possible responses to
parallel proceedings: (1) stay or dismiss the domestic action; (2) enjoin the parties from proceeding
in the foreign forum (referred to as an antisuit injunction); or (3) allow both suits to proceed
simultaneously, with the likely attendant race to judgment. The proliferation of multiple proceed-
ings has led to a variety of approaches, especially in U.S. courts, which reflect the doctrinal
inconsistencies in analyzing multiple proceedings, often with tools developed for purely domestic
use, such as abstention.3 These divergent methods highlight the need for a uniform treatment
of parallel proceedings in domestic and foreign forums. This year's decisions reflect an increasing
acknowledgment of the role of comity, even in purely private commercial matters, but also
an increasing acceptance at the lower court level of the availability of antisuit injunctions.
*Barton Legum is a Vice-Chair of the International Litigation Committee and Counsel at Debevoise &Plimpton,
New York, New York.
"Louise Ellen Teitz is a Co-Chair of the International Litigation Committee and a professor of law at the
Roger Williams University School of Law in Bristol, Rhode Island.
1. Airbus Industrie GIE v. Patel, [1998] 2 All ER 257, [1998] 2 WLR 686 (H.L.).
2. See generaily Louise E . EN TErrz, TRANSNATIONAL LrrIGATiON 233-50 (1996).
3. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
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A. To STAY OR NOT TO STAY
During 1998, the lower courts continued to struggle with whether to stay or dismiss domestic
litigation in favor of parallel foreign proceedings, again relying on inconsistent legal theories.4
District courts continued to rely myopically on wholly domestic abstention doctrine as support
for staying or dismissing cases in U.S. courts in deference to pending foreign actions.' In a
typical case, Finova Capital Corp. v. Ryan Helicopers US.A., Inc.,6 a district court in the Seventh
Circuit stayed' later-filed U.S. litigation pending completion of earlier-filed litigation in St.
Lucia, relying explicitly and exclusively on the Colorado Rivers abstention doctrine. The suit
arose from a helicopter lease agreement providing that Ryan Helicopters could purchase the
helicopters for a set amount at the end of the lease from Rotocraft Partnerships, Ltd. The
original agreement had both Illinois choice of forum and law clauses. A later supplemental
agreement designated either Illinois or St. Lucia for both forum and choice of law. Rotocraft
assigned its interest in the lease to Finova. Subsequently, Ryan tendered to Rotocraft the
remaining lease payments and the required lump sum payment for purchase, which Rotocraft
refused. Ryan filed suit in St. Lucia, where the helicopters were located, for breach of contract
against Rotocraft. Finova subsequently intervened in the St. Lucia litigation. Four months after
the St. Lucia action was filed, Finova filed an action against Ryan in the Northern District of
Illinois Federal Court seeking a declaration that it was the sole owner of the helicopters.
While acknowledging that parallel litigation should ordinarily proceed simultaneously,' the
district court determined that "exceptional circumstances" provided a basis for abstention. The
court took the Colorado River doctrine in whole and transported it into federal/foreign litigation,
while even quoting the purely domestic state/federal factors, such as "the relative progress of
the state and federal proceedings."
10
Although the court dutifully reviewed the Colorado River factors, it applied a hybrid that
also included forum non conveniens analysis. Thus the court says: "Further, as Finova concedes,
this case involves a contract dispute that will likely be resolved under Illinois law and does not
involve any federal questions. Thus, there is no strong federal interest that this case be adjudicated
4. See Louise Ellen Teitz, Imernaional Litigation, I. Parallel PI wding. Treading Carefully, 32 INT'L LAW.
223 (1998).
5. The inappropriateness of relying on domestic abstention doctrines, even the more closely aligned one,
Colorado River abstention or "wise judicial administration," is mentioned also in Evergreen Marine Corp. v. Wegrow
IntemationalInc., 954 F. Supp. 101, 104(S.D.N.Y. 1997). While Colorado River and its progeny may be instructive
in the present context, the considerations involved in deferring to state court proceedings are different from those
involved in deferring to foreign proceedings, where concerns of international comity arise and issues of federalism
and federal supremacy are not in play. Id. at 104. See generally Louise Ellen Teitz, Taking Multiple Bites of the
Appie: A Proposal to Resolve Conflicts of Jurisdiaion and Multiple Proceedings, 26 INT'L LAw. 21 (1992).
6. Finova Capital Corp. v. Ryan Helicopters U.S.A., No. 98C 0761, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15874, at
-I (N.D. IM. 1998).
7. Defendants sought to have the U.S. suit dismissed because it was duplicative, or in the alternative, to
stay the U.S. litigation. Unlike many parallel litigation cases, defendants did not argue in the alternative for a
dismissal on the basis of forum non conveniens.
8. Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). See also Teitz, supra note
4, at 238-40. See generally Linda Mullenix, A Brancb Too Far: Pruning the Abstention Doctrine 75 Gao. L. J. 99
(1986).
9. "[P]aralld proceedings on the same in personam claim should ordinarily be allowed to proceed simultane-
ously, at least until a judgment is reached in one which can be pled as res judicata in the other." Laker Airways,
Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 926-27 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (footnote omitted). See Scheiner
v. Wallace, 832 F. Supp. 687, 693 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), dismissed, sanctins disallowed, 860 F. Supp. 991 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) ("general rule of comity requires domestic court to exercise jurisdiction concurrendy with foreign court").
10. Finova, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15874, at *9.
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in federal court."" This last statement suggests that federal courts have a basis to abstain in
any diversity-based (as opposed to federal question) litigation involving foreign parties since
there would be no "strong federal interest." The court identified no "exceptional circumstances"
justifying abstention other than the "judicial economy" to be achieved by avoiding "duplicative
and wasteful litigation." Nor did the court give much weight to the multiple choice of forum
and law clauses suggesting the possibility that the parties considered concurrent actions. "We
will not allow a private agreement permitting duplicative and wasteful litigation to extinguish
our ability to stay such an action." 2 In the end, the court never really came to terms with
the competing doctrines: the Laker directive of parallel proceedings and the Colorado River
abstention for judicial economy.
B. Arrrisurr INJUNCTIONS IN 1998
When considering the reverse-image issue of whether to grant an antisuit injunction, the
lower courts seem to have had less difficulty, perhaps because the precedent, although divided,"
is more settled than that dealing with staying, abstaining, and/or dismissing. Thus, in one recent
case"4 involving parallel proceedings in France and Quebec, the court had no difficulty denying
an antisuit injunction and deciding that the Third Circuit had determined that "[i]n sum,
duplication of issues and harassment do not justify interfering with an in personam action in
a foreign court.""
Similarly, a New York federal court also had no difficulty deciding to deny an antisuit
injunction, relying on the relatively dear Second Circuit precedent established in Cbina Trade
d Deveopment v. MIV Cboong Yong.' In Hamilton Bank, NA. v. Kookmin Bank, 7 a Korean
bank sued Hamilton Bank in Korea for failure to pay on a letter of credit 'issued in favor of
a Korean exporting firm. The Korean suit was filed in December 1997; the reverse-image
declaratory judgment 8 and antisuit injunction action was filed by Hamilton Bank three and
a half months later in federal court. The gist of Hamilton's argument for an antisuit injunction
enjoining Kookmin from continuing to prosecute its Korean suit was that "the Korean action
is designed to evade U.S. principles of personal jurisdiction protected by the Due Process
clause" and would "frustrate the Constitutional requirements of minimum contacts and personal
jurisdiction."" The district court, perhaps too patiently and elaborately, rejected Hamilton's
arguments based on U.S. public policy, before eventually getting to the crux that Hamilton
could default and contest jurisdiction of the Korean court collaterally in the United States when
Kookmin sought to enforce any judgment-a lesson that every first-year law student learns in
civil procedure. Hamilton admitted that its only assets to satisfy any Korean judgment Kookmin
might obtain were in the United States. ° In effect, Hamilton attempted to challenge personal
11. Id. at *10.
12. Id. at *13.
13. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 12 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6610.
14. Armstrong World Indus. v. Sommer Allibert, S.A., No. Civ. 97-3914, 1998 WL 195938 (ED. Pa.
1998).
15. Id. at * I (discussing controlling decision of Campagne des Bauxies de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.,
651 F.2d 877 (3d Cit. 1981).
16. China Trade & Development v. M/V Choony Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1987).
17. Hamilton Bank, N.A. v. Kookmin Bank, 999 F. Supp. 586 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
18. Hamilton Bank's suit also included a claim for libel.
19. Hamilton Bank, 999 F. Supp. at 588.
20. See id. at 590 n.16.
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jurisdiction in foreign litigation in advance of any recognition-and-enforcement action, using
the defense of due process offensively to thwart earlier-commenced in personam proceedings.
Why, the district court felt constrained to give such a detailed discussion, including suggesting
that "Korea's concept of personal jurisdiction is not at substantial variance with our own,"2
is unclear given Hamilton's failure to raise any significant arguments under Cbina Trade or the
American Home Assurance Corp." factors. The court, dignifying Hamilton's argument with a
serious review, potentially provides the basis for parties to seek antisuit injunctions to stop any
foreign litigation that might not be consistent with U.S. definitions of personal jurisdiction.
In addition, the court's inclusion in its analysis of political factors is disconcerting. The court
suggests that it "declines to enjoin the prosecution of an ordinary civil action in the courts of
afriendly nation and major trading partner"-neither of which are necessarily factors that have
been recognized in other antisuit actions and both of which impart aspects of foreign-rdations law
that are arguably not properly the province of the judicial branch. However, these factors can
be read narrowly to reflect an awareness of the need for comity when considering interfering
with proceedings in a foreign court.
C. EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF ANTisurr INJUNcrIONS
Although some courts had assumed that antisuit injunctions could be issued in admiralty actions,
the Second Circuit explicitly recognized the authority of an admiralty court to issue antisuit"4
injunctions in FarrellLines Inc. v. Ceres Terminals Inc.,25 and affirmed the action of the lower court.
Farrell Lines issued a bill of lading in connection with transporting a printing press from Italy to
Virginia, which bill of lading provided that it was subject to the provisions of the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), 6 including the S 500 liability limit. The bill of lading also contained
aU.S. choiceoflaw clause and a choiceof forum clause for the federal district court fortheSouthem
District of New York. During the unloading in Virginia, the press was damaged in the amount
of approximately $800,000. Farrell filed suit in July 1996 for declaratory and injunctive relief
limiting its liability for damage to the cargo to S 500 and declaring that any suit must be brought
in New York federal court. The subrogated insurers of the cargo filed suit in Italy six weeks later,
seeking recovery for the damage to the cargo. Farrell also sought an antisuit injunction prohibiting
the defendant insurers from continuing with litigation elsewhere, in particular in Italy. The defen-
dants moved to dismiss in the federal court on several grounds, or in the alternative, to stay the
New York action in favor of the Italian suit.
21. Id. at 590.
22. American Home Assurance Corp. v. Insurance Corp. of Ir., 603 F. Supp. 636, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
See aiso China Trade Dev. Corp. v. M/V Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1987) ([F]ive factors are suggested
in determining whether the foreign action should be enjoined: (1) frustration of a policy in the enjoining forum;
(2) the foreign action would be vexatious; (3) a threat to the issuing court's in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction;
(4) the proceedings in the other forum prejudice other equitable considerations; or (5) adjudication of the same
issue in separate actions would result in dday,, inconvenience, expense, inconsistency, or a race to judgment.).
In Nagoya Venture Ltd. v. Bacopulos, 96 Civ. 9317 (DLQ, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8580 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), another
New York federal court granted an antisuit injunction in connection with two legal actions pending in Canada.
The court recognized the five-factor American Home Assurance test, but admitted that it was not "specifically
examining each factor."
23. Hamilton Bank, 999 F. Supp. at 590-591.
24. Farrell Lines Inc. v. Ceres Terminals Inc., 161 F.3d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 1998) (The Second Circuit also
referred to this as an "anti-foreign suit injunction").
25. Farrell Lines, Inc. v. Ceres Terminals, Inc., 1997 WL 570494 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) aftd, 161 F.3d 115 (2d
Cir. 1998).
26. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1300 et seq.
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The district court enforced the forum selection clause and the COGSA limitation, and issued
the antisuit injunction, relying on the Cbina Trade precedent and the five factors from American
Home Assurance Corp.27 In issuing the injunction, the district court determined that the parallel
Italian litigation frustrated policies of the U.S. forum: (1) U.S. policy favoring enforcement of
forum selection clauses, and (2) COGSA limitation of liability provisions in the bill of lading.
The defendants admitted that under Italian law Italian courts would not enforce either policy.
From this admission, the district court interpreted the filing of the parallel suit as deliberate
evasion of U.S. policy and therefore enjoined the defendants from continuing in the Italian
forum. But the court could only point to one other court that "previously enjoined a foreign
suit where that suit was filed in violation of a forum selection clause."'2 1 Finally, the district
court decided that it could apply a more lenient standard to the antisuit injunction since it
was also deciding the merits of the plaintiff's claim (which was basically a restatement of the
two policies allegedly defeated by the filing of the Italian action.) Thus, this court would suggest
that any time one files a suit in a federal court in contravention of a forum selection clause,
an antisuit injunction should issue based on the frustration of the policy of enforcing forum
selection clauses-or what appears to amount to a bootstrapping argument that allows an antisuit
injunction to issue to stop any challenge in a foreign forum to the enforceability of a forum
selection clause. Although the district court relied on Carnival Cruise Lines29 and The Bremen
v. Zapata,3' both admiralty cases, for the policy of enforcing forum selection clauses, neither
of those cases, nor Farrell, appears to limit the willingness to issue an antisuit injunction to
enforce a disputed forum selection clause to admiralty cases.
D. CoMn-v GAINs GROUND ABROAD
The importance of comity in the face of multiple proceedings was recognized by the House
of Lords when it set aside an earlier-granted antisuit injunction in Airbus Industrie GIE v. Patel,"1
a case which involved litigation in Bangalore, India and in Texas state and federal court as
well. Unlike earlier antisuit injunction cases where England was one of the potential forums,
Airbus considered the availability of antisuit injunctions in a case where England was not the
natural forum, but rather was selecting between other alternative forums, Texas and India,
but the parties sought to be restrained were within the jurisdiction of the English courts. The
defendants' counsel described the English courts as acting as an "international policeman."
The case arose out the crash of an Indian Airlines flight involving an Airbus A 3 20 in Bangalore,
killing ninety-two persons and injuring the surviving passengers. Four British citizens living in
London were killed and four were injured. In addition, there were three Americans who were
also killed; none, however, were from Texas. In February 1992, the English plaintiffs filed
suit against the airline and airport company in India. The English claimants subsequently settled
with the airline for the full amount of its limited liability. They also initiated suit in Texas
against several parties, the most significant being Airbus Industrie, the manufacturer of the
27. American Home Assurance Corp., 603 F. Supp. at 636, 643.
28. Farrell Lines, 1997 WL 570494, at *11.
29. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
30. Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
31. Airbus Industrie GIE v. Pati, [1998] 2 All ER 257, [1998] 2 WLR 686 (H.L.). The Court of Appeals
decision ofJuly 31, 1996, [1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep 8, granting an injunction is reproduced in the August 12, 1996,
edition of THE TimEs. The lower court opinion is reproduced in the May 21, 1996, edition of THE TuEs.
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aircraft." The English claimants sought recovery based on strict liability in Texas, a basis not
available in India. In addition, the Texas forum offered the potential for punitive damages and
contingent fees unavailable in India.
In late 1992, Airbus initiated its own proceedings in India and eventually in April 1995
obtained permanent injunctive relief, restraining the English claimants from suing Airbus any-
where but in Bangalore. The English claimants did not submit to the jurisdiction of the Indian
court in connection with proceedings by or against Airbus.
Airbus subsequently filed in England for injunctive relief relating to the Indian judgment of
April 1995 against the English claimants. The English High Court determined that it could
consider issuing an antisuit injunction even when the English court would not be the natural
forum for the litigation, but based on the facts it denied injunctive relief.
The Court of Appeals reversed. While it found it appropriate to extend antisuit injunctions
to situations where the action being allowed to proceed was outside of England, the court
found injustice because forum non conveniens was not available in Texas in cases such as this
one. The court, after determining that India was the appropriate forum, balanced the prejudice
to Airbus against the deprivation of "legitimate advantages" the English claimants would enjoy
in litigating in Texas. Texas rather was a "manifestly inappropriate forum," having no connection
to the parties or claims. Because the English claimants chose not to sue Airbus in India or
alternatively in France, another appropriate forum under the Brussels Convention, but rather
to sue in a "dearly inappropriate forum," the Court of Appeals described this conduct as
"prima facie oppressive." Of crucial significance to the ultimate decision that Texas was an
inappropriate forum was the determination that dismissal based on forum non conveniens was
not available.
The House of Lords reversed the granting of the injunction. Lord Goff identified the issue
as determining "for the first time, the limits which comity imposes" on the granting of antisuit
injunctions "as the ends of justice require." Although the appeal concerned the granting of
an antisuit injunction, Lord Goff, in his opinion, focused first on ways in which dashes between
jurisdiction are resolved. He contrasted the civil law system as exemplified by the Brussels
Convention which allocates jurisdiction "on the basis of well-defined rules" with the common-
law doctrine of forum non conveniens-"a self-denying ordinance under which the court will
stay (or dismiss) proceedings in favour of another dearly more appropriate forum." The doctrine
of forum non conveniens is relevant since the legitimacy of the injunction was dependent in
part on the determination of the appropriate forum for the litigation. An antisuit injunction,
available "when the ends of justice require it," may be granted in what Lord Goff referred
to as "an alternative forum case" (here Texas and India) and also in single forum cases (when
an English court is asked to enjoin a party from proceeding in a foreign court with jurisdiction).
The focus of the opinion is on what limits should be placed on issuing an antisuit injunction,
in particular in the form of comity. The opinion reviews the treatment of antisuit injunctions
in England, Australia, Canada, and then the United States, including describing the split among
circuits. Lord Goff discusses with approval the Laker case and the stricter approach taken by
32. See Linton v. Airbus Indus., 934 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, applicationfor
writ of m'orfiledJan. 27, 1997). See al Linton v. Airbus Indus., 30 F. 3d 592 (5th Cir. 1994). The Texas litigation
involved challenges to jurisdiction, both subject matter and personal, although Airbus eventually agreed to personal
jurisdiction. At the time that the English Court of Appeals issued its antisuit injunction, the Texas trial court
had dismissed the claims against Airbus based on the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act. This decision, however,
was pending appeal and was reversed after the English appellate court rendered its decision.
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the Second and Sixth Circuits." Finally, Lord Goff defines the normal requirements oftcomity
before granting an antisuit injunction. "[C]omity requires that the English forum should have
a sufficient interest in, and connection with, the matter in question to justify the indirect
interference with the foreign court which an antisuit injunction entails." Applying these princi-
ples to the Airbus facts, Lord Goff finds that it would be a breach of comity even when the
Indian court is powerless to act and the Texas court, likewise, cannot act in the absence of
the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a "principle [that] is by no means universally accepted,
and in particular is not accepted in most civil law countries."
In his dosing comments, Lord Goff eloquently pleads for comity in the face of excesses in
jurisdiction and multiple proceedings:
Airbus is relying simply on the English court's power of itself, without direct reliance on the Indian
court's decision, to grant an injunction in this case where, unusually, the English jurisdiction has no
interest in, or connection with, the matter in question. I am driven to say that such a course is not
open to the English courts because, for the reasons I have given, it would be inconsistent with comity.
In a world which consists of independent jurisdictions, interference, even indirect interference, by
the courts of one jurisdiction with the exercise of the jurisdiction of a foreign court cannot in my
opinion be justified by the fact that a third jurisdiction is affected but is powerless to intervene. The
basic principle is that only the courts of an interested jurisdiction can act in the matter; and if they
are powerless to do so, that will not of itself be enough to justify the courts of another jurisdiction
to act in their place. Such are the limits of a system which is dependent on the remedy of an antisuit
injunction to curtail the excesses of a jurisdiction which does not adopt the principle, widely accepted
. 34throughout the common law world, of forum non conveniens.
These dosing comments highlight the divergent approaches to parallel proceedings and the
need for a unified approach. Failing the existence of a unified approach, such as forum non
conveniens might supply, comity should be the guiding principle, justifying a court's abstention
or stay or its grant of an antisuit injunction.
II. Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
AMBER L. CorrI*
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)" codifies the "restrictive theory" of foreign
sovereign immunity and provides the exclusive means for obtaining jurisdiction over foreign
3 3 Federal courts in the United States deciding whether to enjoin parallel proceedings in foreign forums
generally divide into two camps: those, such as the D.C., Seventh, and Sixth Circuits, that follow the Laker
Aimwys, Ltd. v. Sabma Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984) "sparingy used" approach (at
least so it is said), and those that use the more liberal approach of the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. Assuming
that the suits involve the same parties and that the resolution of the case in the enjoining court would be dispositive
of the action being enjoined, courts look to see if there is an exception to the general, rule favoring concurrent
litigation. The Laker approach recognizes exceptions when the injunction is necessary (I) to protect the enjoining
court's jurisdiction or (2) to protect important public policy of the forum. "[Dluplication of parties and issues
alone is not sufficient to justify the issuance of an antisuit injunction." Laker, 731 F.2d at 928 (footnote omitted).
The liberal standard of enjoining parallel proceedings in cases of duplicative litigation, as illustrated by the Fifth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuit approaches, accords less weight to comity and more to whether the litigation is
vexatious or'would result in "inequitable hardship" and "tend to frustrate and delay the speedy and efficient
determination of the cause." For a thorough discussion of the two approaches to antisuit injunctions, see George
Bermann, The Use of Anti-Suit Injunction in International Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. TRAN^NAT'L L. 589 (1990);
Note, Antisitlnjunctions andlnternationalComiy, 71 VA. L. Rav. 1039 (1985). See generally Teitz, supra note
2, at 233-50.
34. Airbm [1998] 2 WLR 686.
*Amber L. Cottle is an associate with Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering in Washington, D.C.
35. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1994).
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states and their political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities in courts of the United
States.6 It protects such entities from suit unless their actions fall within one of several enumer-
ated exceptions. 
3
In 1998, the courts examined several aspects of the FSIA. Among other things, they addressed
the applicable time for determining whether a foreign entity qualifies as a "foreign state,"
considered whether the third prong of the commercial activity exception requires a "legally
significant act," clarified several aspects of the new state-sponsored terrorism exception, and
established limits on jurisdictional discovery.
A. FoREIGN STATE STATUS
In order to determine whether the FSIA applies to a defendant, a court must first determine
whether the defendant is a "foreign state." The FSIA defines "foreign state" to include an
"agency or instrumentality of a foreign state," which it in turn defines in relevant part as an
entity "a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or
a political subdivision thereof.""8
Courts in 1998 addressed the appropriate time for examining the majority ownership of an
entity and thus the time for determining whether a foreign entity qualifies for protection under
the FSIA. The Fifth Circuit held that a foreign entity constitutes an "agency or instrumentality"
protected by the FSIA as long as a foreign state owned a majority of the entity's stock at the
time the underlying conduct occurred. In Pere v. Nuovo Pignon, Inc.,"' the survivors of an
employee killed in a turbine explosion off the coast of Angola brought a wrongful death suit
against the turbine's manufacturer. At the time of the accident, an agency or instrumentality
of the Italian government owned a majority of the manufacturer's stock. By the time the
survivors filed suit, however, the manufacturer's Italian-owned parent company had transferred
the manufacturer's stock to a consortium of private companies.
The court noted that the issue of "[w]hether the FSIA covers an entity now private that
was state owned at the time of the disputed event(s)" was a question of "first impression" for
the Fifth Circuit, and that the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have decided the question differently.'
The court ultimately determined that including such entities within the FSIA's coverage best
promotes the FSIA's purposes because the foreign policy concerns underlying the FSIA "do
not necessarily disappear when a defendant loses its foreign status before suit is filed.""' The
court therefore concluded that a foreign entity's status should be determined as of the date
that the underlying conduct occurred, and it accordingly held that the turbine manufacturer
constituted an "agency or instrumentality" of a foreign state under the FSIA.42
The Southern District of New York held that a foreign entity constitutes an "agency or
instrumentality" protected by the FSIA either if the foreign state owned a majority of the
36. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 12 (1976), supra note 13.
37. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994).
38. Id. § 1603(a)-(b).
39. Pere v. Nuovo Pignone, Inc., 150 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 1998).
40. Id. at 480 (discussing General Ekitrk Capital Cotp. v. Grossman, 991 F.2d 1376 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding
that the FSIA covers such entities because the appropriate date for determining an entity's status is the date that
the underlying conduct occurred), and Strub v. A.P. Grn, 38 F. 3d 448 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the FSIA
does not cover such entities because the appropriate date for determining an entity's status is the date that the
plaintiff filed suit)).
41. Id at 481.
42. See id. at 480.
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entity's stock at the time the underlying conduct occurred or if the foreign state owned a
majority of the stock at the time the plaintiff filed suit. In lugobanka A.D. Belgrade v. Sidex
International Furniture Corp.," a bank filed suit against a Slovenian corporation in state court
to enforce defaulted loan agreements related to lines of credit. The Slovenian corporation was
privately owned at the time the plaintiff filed suit, but at the time the alleged conduct occurred,
it was majority owned by the former Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) or
political subdivisions of the SFRY." The corporation removed the action to federal court, and
the bank filed a motion to remand.
The court determined that the Second Circuit has not definitively addressed the question
of the relevant time period for determining foreign state status.' After noting that some courts
examine ownership at the time the underlying conduct occurred and some examine ownership
at the time of the lawsuit, the Jugobanka court created a "unified approach consistent with
the objectives of the FSIA" by combining both alternatives.4 ' The court held that the FSIA
applies, and a foreign entity is therefore entitled to a federal forum, either if: (1) "the underlying
conduct took place on the foreign state's watch," even if that state no longer owned the entity
at the time of the lawsuit; or (2) the foreign state owned a majority of the entity's stock at
the time of the lawsuit, even if it did not own the entity at the time of the underlying conduct. 8
Since the SFRY or its political subdivisions owned the Slovenian corporation at the time it
allegedly defaulted as the guarantor of the lines of credit, the court held that it was entitled
to a federal forum and therefore denied the bank's motion to remand.4'
B. ExcEyTIONs
1. Commercial Acivity Exception
The commercial activity exception abrogates sovereign immunity in any case in which the
action is based upon: (1) a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign
state; (2) an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of
the foreign state elsewhere; or (3) an act outside the territory of the Untied States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in
the United States.'0
In 1998, the courts struggled with whether the third, "direct effect in the United States,"
prong of the commercial activity exception requires the foreign state to have engaged in a
43. See Jugbanka v. Sidex Int'l Furniture Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
44. See id at 409.
45. When actions are filed against entities that fall within the FSIA, they may remove them from state to
federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1998).
46. See Iugobanka, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 412.
47. Id
48. Id. at 414.
49. See id at 415. Acard Sablic v. Croatia Line, 719 A.2d 172, 175 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) ("A
defendant is immune from suit pursuant to the Act if it was a 'foreign state' ... either when the conduct occurred
which is the basis for the suit or when the complaint was filed." (citations omitted)). See also Daly v. Castro
Llanes, No. 98 Civ. 1196 (AGS), 1998 WL 879268, at *7-12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1998) (holdingthat a foreign
bank that was privately owned at the time of the underlying conduct but wholly owned by an agency of the
Republic of Venezuela at the time of the lawsuit qualified as an "agency or instrumentality" of a foreign state
for purposes of the FSIA's service of process requirements, but also holding that the bank's actions were "commer-
cial" for purposes of the FSIA's commercial activity exception in part because the bank was privately owned at
the time that the underlying conduct occurred).
50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(aX2) (1998).
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"legally significant act" in the United States. In Hand Bank v. PT. Bank Negara Indonesia, the
Second Circuit reaffirmed its prior holdings that a "legally significant act" giving rise to the
daim must occur in the United States in order to satisfy the FSIA's requirement that the direct
effect occur "in the United States."" A financial loss suffered by a United States citizen in
the United States does not suffice."2 In Hanil Bank, the plaintiff had sued a bank owned by
Indonesia for breach of a letter of credit that the Indonesian bank had issued." The letter of
credit required the bank to pay at a location designated by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff
designated New York City, but the bank refused to pay.'" The Second Circuit conduded that,
because the breach of contract, "the most legally significant act," occurred in the United States
when the bank failed to pay the requisite funds to the designated New York bank, the bank's
actions caused a direct effect in the United States and therefore fell within the commercial
activity exception to the FSIA"
The Fifth Circuit, however, rejected the "legally significant act" requirement. 6 In Vowt-Alpim
Trading USA Corp. v. Bank ofCbina," a domestic seller had similarly sued a foreign instrumental-
ity, the Bank of China, for breach of a letter of credit that the bank had issued. Because the
United States plaintiff suffered a financial loss in the United States as a result of the bank's
actions, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the bank's actions caused a direct effect in the United
States for purposes of the third prong of the commercial activity exception."
The court rejected the bank's argument that its actions did not cause a direct effect in the
United States because neither the "place of payment" nor any other "legally significant act"
occurred in the United States." The court acknowledged that other circuits have adopted such
a requirement, but it refused to follow those courts because it conduded that (1) the statutory
text does not support such a requirement, and (2) imposing such a requirement would make
the second and third prongs of the commercial activity exception indistinguishable.60
2. State-Sponsored Terrorism Exception
In the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Congress enacted amendments
to the FSIA that created an exception to the immunity of those foreign states that the State
Department officially designates as terrorist states if the foreign state commits a terrorist act,
or provides material support and resources to an individual or entity that commits such an
act, that results in the death or personal injury of a United States national.6' Congress subse-
quently enacted further amendments as part of the 1997 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations
51. Hanil Bank v. PT Bank Negara Indon., 148 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 1998).
52. Seid at 133-34.
53. See id. at 127.
54. Se id at 129-30.
55. Id at 133. See ao Filetech S.A.v. France Telcom S.A., 157 F.3d 922, 931 (2d Cir. 1998) (reaffirming
"legally significant acts" test).
56. See Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of China, 142 F.3d 887, 897 (5th Cir. 1998), on. denied,
119 S. Ct. 591 (1998).
57. Id.
58. See id. at 896-97.
59. See id
60. See id at 894-95.
61. See Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 221(a), 110 Stat.
1214, 1241-42 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)). The terrorist acts that the exception covers include
"an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, [or] hostage taking." 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7).
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Act that made punitive damages available against officials, employees, and agents of a foreign
state in actions brought under the state-sponsored terrorism exception.
Several courts addressed these amendments in 1998. The Second Circuit upheld the
constitutionality of the exception's provision of subject matter jurisdiction in Rein v. Socialist
People's Libyan Arab Jamabiriya.6 The case involved a suit against Libya filed by the survivors
and representatives of persons killed aboard Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Libya
objected to the court's exercise of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the state-sponsored
terrorism exception on the ground that the exception creates subject matter jurisdiction
over foreign sovereigns only if the State Department designates the particular foreign state
as a sponsor of terrorism. Libya contended that the exception unconstitutionally delegates
the core legislative power of determining the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts
to the State Department.
The Second Circuit agreed with Libya that several courts have expressed doubts as to whether
Congress can constitutionally delegate the power to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts,
but the court concluded that no delegation had in fact occurred in the case. Congress, rather
than the State Department, decided to subject Libya to jurisdiction under the state-sponsored
terrorism exception. Since Libya was already on the State Department's list of foreign state
sponsors of terrorism at the time Congress enacted the state-sponsored terrorism exception,
no decision by the State Department was needed to create jurisdiction over Libya for its alleged
role in the bombing of Pan Am 10 3. Jurisdiction instead existed at the moment the amendment
became law. The court noted, however, that a litigant might be able to raise the issue of
unconstitutional delegation if the State Department places a new foreign sovereign on the
relevant list or deletes a foreign sovereign from the list in effect when the exception was enacted.
If the former situation occurs, a foreign sovereign defendant might have a valid delegation
defense, and if the latter situation occurs, a plaintiff might have such a defense. Since Libya
was on the list at the time the exception was enacted, however, and therefore could not raise
such a defense, the court declined to decide the issue.
The District Court for the District of Columbia issued two opinions that clarified various aspects
of the state-sponsored terrorism exception. The opinions conflicted, however, as to the availability
of punitive damages against the foreign state itself. In Flatow v. Islamic Republic ofIran, the estate
of an American student killed in a suicide bomber attack on a tourist bus in Israel filed a wrongful
death claim against Iran and its officials." The court awarded substantial damages to the estate
and held, among other things, that: (1) the amendments apply retroactively; 61 (2) federal common
law supplies the rules of decision in a case brought pursuant to the amendments;66 (3) the extraterri-
torial application of the amendments is proper and was congressionally intended;67 (4) "the routine
provision of financial assistance to a terrorist group in support of its terrorist activities constitutes
the provision of material support or resources within the meaning of the exception;" 66 (5) the
actions of a foreign state's officials, employees, or agents may be imputed to the foreign state
if they routinely provide material support or resources to a terrorist group whose activities are
62. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 589, 110 Stat. 3008, 3009-172 (1996) (reprinted in note following 28
U.S.C.A. § 1605).
63. Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 162 F.3d 748 (2d Cir. 1998).
64. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1998).
65. See id. at 13-14.
66. See id at 14-15.
67. See id. at 15-16.
68. Id at 18.
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consistent with the foreign state's customs or policies;69 (6) a foreign state is not a "person" entitled
to the protections of constitutional due process, but even if it is, a United States court may constitu-
tionally exercise personal jurisdiction where the factual predicate required by the state-sponsored
terrorism exception is present; 7° (7) defenses such as head-of-state immunity and forum non conve-
niens are not available in suits brought pursuant to the state-sponsored terrorism exception; 7 and
(8) Congress intended to alter section 1606's general prohibition on punitive damages against
foreign states in order to deter state-sponsored terrorism, and the amendments to the FSIA there-
fore should be construed to permit punitive damages against foreign states as well as their agents.72
In a subsequent case against Iran, however, the D.C. district court held that punitive damages
are not available against the foreign state itself under the state-sponsored terrorism exception."
In Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, United States citizens sued Iran for injuries they suffered
in the course of their kidnaping, imprisonment, and torture by agents of Iran in Beirut, Leba-
non.74 The court awarded compensatory damages but concluded that section 1606 of the FSIA
applies to causes of action brought pursuant to the state-sponsored terrorism exception and
therefore refused to award punitive damages against Iran." Although the court cited Fatow
for various propositions throughout its opinion, it did not discuss Fatow ms contrary conclusion
on punitive damages.76
C. JURISDICTIONAL, DISCOVERY
The D.C. Circuit restricted the ability of plaintiffs to depose foreign cabinet-level officials
in order to determine the applicability of an FSIA exception. In In re Papandou, a Ilberian
corporation and its president filed a breach of contract action against the Greek Minister of
Tourism and other Greek government entities following revocation of the corporation's casino
license in Greece.77 After the defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on several jurisdictional
grounds, including the FSIA, the district court ordered oral depositions of various Greek cabinet
ministers to determine if any FSIA exceptions applied.7"
The D.C. Circuit issued a rare writ of mandamus to vacate the discovery order, holding
that the district court had erred in two respects. 7' First, the district court erred in ordering the
oral depositions of cabinet-level officials without first considering less intrusive means of obtaining
the requested information such as interrogatories or depositions of lower-level Greek officials."0
Second, the district court should have considered the other potentially dispositive jurisdictional
69. See id.
70. See id. at 19-23. Specifically, the court held that a foreign state that sponsors terrorist acts that cause the
death or personal injury of a United States national has sufficient "minimum contacts" with the United States
such that the maintenance of a suit against it would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice. See id. at 21-2 3.
71. See id at 24-25.
72. See id. at 25-27.
73. See Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D.D.C. 1998).
74. See id.
75. See id at 69. See aw Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1248-49 & n.8 (S.D. Fla. 1997)
(similarly conduding that, although section 1606 did not preclude punitive damages against the Cuban Air Force,
it did preclude such damages against Cuba itsd.
76. See id.
77. In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
78. See id
79. Seeid
80. See id. at 253-54.
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defenses that the defendants had asserted before allowing FSIA discovery." Although the court
acknowledged that the resolutibn of other jurisdictional defenses before the immunity defense
might irreparably impair the benefits of immunity, it nonetheless held that "[i]f one (or more)
of the other jurisdictional defenses hold out the promise of being cheaply decisive, and the
defendant wants it decided first, it may well be best to grapple with it (or them) first" in order
to minimize the total costs imposed on the defendant."
111. Forum Selection and Forum Non Conveniens
EDGARD ALvAREz*
Parties to international transactions frequently seek to eliminate through the use of forum
selection dauses the uncertainty of being forced to litigate in unexpected venues any daims
arising under their contracts." Such provisions were recognized to be enforceable in the United
States by the 1971 Supreme Court decision in The Bremen v. Zapata Offibore Co.'4 and can
be challenged only on limited grounds." A dispute over the validity of a forum selection clause
usually arises in the context of a defendant's challenge to the plaintiffs commencing suit in a
forum other than that chosen in the agreement.' 6 Although such a challenge usually involves
a challenge to the jurisdiction of the court selected by the plaintiff, 7 that is not always the
case." In contrast, application of the forum non conveniens doctrine" as the grounds for
dismissal is premised on the assumption that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant and
the daims.' °
A. 1998 DEvELOPMENTs ON FORUM SELEcrION CLAUSES
1. Forum Sekacion Clauses and the Anti-waiver Provisions of the US. Securities Laws
The trepidations sent throughout the U.S. legal community by the 1997 decision in Ricbards
v. Lloyd's of London came to an end in 1998." In Ricbards I, a panel of the Ninth Circuit held
unenforceable the choice of law and choice of forum provisions used by Uoyd's of London
81. See id at 253-54.
82. Id. at 254.
*Edgard Alvarez is an associate with Clifford Chance in New York, New York.
83. See Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 593-94.
84. See Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12-13.
85. Bremen articulated three such grounds: (1) if the forum selection was inserted in the agreement as a result
of fraud, undue influence, or overreaching; (2) if the choice of forum contravenes a strong public policy of the
forum where the suit is brought; or (3) if trial in the contractual forum would be so gravely difficult and inconvenient
that giving effect to the clause would, for practical purposes, amount to a denial of the right to a day in court.
See Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12, 15, 18.
86. See id
87. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 588; New Moon Shipping Co. v. Man B & W Diesel AG, 121
F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 1997).
88. See New Moon, 121 F.3d at 28 (explaining that no consensus exists as to the proper procedural mechanism
to request dismissal of a suit based on a valid forum selection clause). See also Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd's,
148 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1998).
89. In the words of the Supreme Court, "the principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may
resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute."
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947).
90. Seeid
91. Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 107 F.3d 1422 (9th Ci. 1997) [hereinafter Rbardr 1]. See also Dhindsa
and Ostrove, International Legal Devdpments in Review: 199 7-Inermationa Litigatin-Fomn Selection and Forum
Non GmCnveims, 32 lmr'L lAwYEa 233 (1998).
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in its contracts with U.S. underwriting syndicate members." The provisions, which called for
application of English law by English courts, were found by the panel to violate the anti-waiver
provisions of the U.S. securities laws."3
Upon reconsideration en banc, the Ninth Circuit withdrew Ricbards J and affirmed the
district court's decision to enforce the choice of law and forum selection clauses. 9 In doing
so, the Ninth Circuit brought itself in line with six other circuits that had ruled on the issue.9'6
Ricbards II starts with the premise that under the Bremen analysis "courts should enforce
choice of law and choice of forum clauses in cases of freely negotiated private international
agreement[s]. "' Then, relying on Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 9 Ricbards I rejects the contention
that to enforce the agreement to litigate the plaintiffs' claim in England would contravene the
strong public policies embodied in federal and state securities laws."
A case closely watched in the aftermath of Ricbards I was Stamm v. Barclays Bank of New
York, a Second Circuit decision also involving the enforceability of the Lloyd's choice of
law and forum selection clauses." ° Although the Second Circuit had already passed on the
enforceability of such clauses," it had done so relying, in part, on the fact that the Securities and
Exchange Commission had "consistently exempted Uoyd's from the registration requirements of
the securities laws.""°2 The SEC's filing of an amicus curiae brief in the Ninth Circuit expressing
the agency's support for the conclusions of Ricbards I led some to believe that the Second
Circuit's decision in Roby might no longer be good law. In Stamm, the Second Circuit rejected
such contentions, characterizing its holding in Roby as resting "primarily on the adequacy of
English law to deter fraud and misrepresentation, to encourage full disclosure and to provide
plaintiffs remedies in the event of a fraud,'' ° 3
2. Cballenges to the Enforceabiity of the Contract as a Whok
In Afram Carriers, Inc. v. Moeykens,"'° the Fifth Circuit upheld the enforcement of a forum
selection clause contained in a settlement and release executed in Peru by the widow and heirs
of a security guard who died aboard the defendant's ship from inhalation of toxic substances
used to fumigate the vessel.' The court rejected the attack on the forum selection clause as
92. Ricbards 1, 107 F.3d at 1428-29.
93. See id
94. Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F.3d 1289, an. denied, 119 S. Ct. 365 (1998) [hereinafter Rihard
Ill.
95. See id.
96. See, e.g., Haynsworth v. The Corporation, 121 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1997); Allen v. Lloyd's of London,
94 F.3d 923 (4th Cit. 1996); Shell v. R.W. Sturge, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1227 (6th Cir. 1995); Bonny v. Society of
Lloyd's, 3 F.Jd 156 (7th Cit. 1993); Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir. 1993); Riley v.
Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953 (10th Cit. 1992). Shortly after Richards 1 was decided, the
Eleventh Circuit joined these seven other circuits in upholding the Lloyd's choice of law and forum selection
clauses. Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 148 F.3d 1285 (1998).
97. Rkards , 135 F.3d at 1292-93 (quoting Bemen, with internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (enforcing arbitration before the International Chamber
of Commerce in a dispute involving a securities transaction).
99. See Ricbards , 135 F.3d at 1294.
100. Stamm v. Barclays Bank of N.Y., 153 F.3d 30 (2d Cit. 1998).
101. See Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353 (2d Cit. 1993).
102. Id. at 1365-66.
103. Stamms, 153 F.3d at 33.
104. Afram Carriers, Inc. v. Moeykens, 145 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 1998).
105. See id at 300.
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procured through fraud, overreaching, and mistake because it found that the allegations, if
proven, would affect the entire settlement and release agreement and not the specific forum
selection dause. "
By contrast, in Evolution Online Systems v. Koninklijke PTT Nederland, ° 7 the Second Circuit
held that it was premature for the lower court to determine that the parties were bound by
a forum selection dause contained in several drafts exchanged during the unsuccessful preparation
of a final written agreement."'i Since the forum selection dause found by the lower court
specifically related to any dispute arising from the contract that the parties were negotiating,
if no contract was found to exist, the language of the forum selection dause could not operate
to deprive the plaintiff of its right to sue in a court other than the one chosen in the forum
selection clause."M
B. 1998 lDEVELOPMENTS ON FORUM NON CONVENIENS
By its terms, the Second Circuit decision in PT United Can Co. Ltd. v. Crown Cork & Seal
Co". 1 appeared to have relaxed the burden of persuasion faced by U.S. defendants seeking to
have daims asserted by a foreign plaintiff dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds. In
Crown, an Indonesian corporation sued its minority shareholder, a Pennsylvania corporation,
alleging breach of a shareholder agreement."' Refusing to reverse the lower court's forum non
conveniens dismissal, the Second Circuit reasoned that "on the record before it, the district
court might have employed its discretion to rule either way on defendant Crown's forum non
conveniens motion. The inquiry could reasonably have rendered either result.'.. This analysis,
which would appear to introduce an "all things being equal, dismiss" standard, is hard to
reconcile with the principle announced by the Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbrt,,"'
still the leading forum non conveniens case, according to which, "unless the balance is strongly
in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed..... In
subsequent 1998 decisions, however, the Second Circuit made no mention of its language in
Crown, and used, instead, the traditional Gilbert analysis."'
In Boosey & Hawkes Music Publisbers v. Walt Disney Co.," 6 the Second Circuit reversed the
lower court's forum non conveniens dismissal of the plaintiffs daim that the distribution of
the film Fantasia in several foreign countries violated the plaintiffs rights under the copyrights
laws of eighteen countries." 7 Reversing the lower court's decision to dismiss based, in part,
on the difficulty of applying so many foreign laws,"' the court indicated that "it seems ...
106. See id at 302 nn.3-4.
107. Evolution Online Sys. v. Koninklijke PTr Nederland, 145 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 1998).
108. See id at 509.
109. See id
110. PT United Can Co. Ltd. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 138 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1998).
111. Seeid at 68.
112. Id at 75.
113. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
114. Id. at 508.
115. See, e.g., Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998); Evolution
Online Sys. v. Koninklijke IT Nederland, 145 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 1998); Capital Currency Exch. v. National
Westminster Bank, 155 F.3d 603 (2d Cir. 1998); Alfadda v. Fenn, 159 F.3d 41; Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d
153 (2d Cir. 1998).
116. Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998).
117. At issue were the plaintiffs copyrights to Stravinsky's "The Right of Spring." Se id. at 483.
118. See Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers v. Walt Disney, 934 F. Supp. 119, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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likely that Disney's motion seeks to split the suit into 18 parts in 18 nations, complicate the
suit, delay it, and render it more expensive ... Everything before us suggests that trial would
be more easy, expeditious and inexpensive in the district court than dispersed to 18 foreign
nations. " 9
In addition to addressing the enforceability of a draft forum selection dause as such, in
Evolution Online Sys. v. Koninklike PTT Nederland, " the Second Circuit addressed the import
of such a clause in a non-contractual forum non conveniens analysis. The court first reiterated
the principle announced by the Supreme Court in Gilbert that "requires a court to defer to a
plaintiffs choice of forum unless the forum non conveniens factors strongly favor dismissal,
especially when the plaintiff resides in the forum state...... The court added, however, that it
was persuaded by the decision in Kultur International Films Ltd v. Covent Garden Pioneer,
FSP.,Ltd... to the effect that, where the parties exchanged proposed drafts of an agreement
containing a forum selection clause not included in the final agreement, and the reason for its
omission is unclear, a court must factor the proposed forum selection clause into its forum
non conveniens analysis by starting its review of the Gilbert factors "with a level set of balances,
rather than one weighed heavily in favor of the plaintiffs choice of forum. 123
Acknowledging its disagreement with the Fifth Circuit,12 4 in Capital Curremy Excbange v.
National Westminster Bank"' the Second Circuit reaffirmed its 1987 holding in Trannenion





IV. Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law
MICHAEL M. OsmovE*
The United States legal system does not abide by a unified and strict set of rules regarding
when its laws may be applied to persons or events outside its borders. For this reason, the
U.S. courts have continually struggled to find an appropriate balance between a general presump-
119. B&osey& Hawkes, 145 F.3d at 492.
120. See id. at 505.
121. Id at 510 (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255-56 (1981)).
122. Kultur Int'l Films Ltd. v. Covent Garden Pioneer, FSP, Ltd., 860 F. Supp. 1055 (D. NJ. 1994).
123. Booy & Hawkes, 145 F.3d at J 11.
124. See Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., 671 F.2d 876, 890 (5th Cir. 1982).
125. Capital Currency Exch. v. National Westminster Bank, 155 F.3d 603 (2d Cir. 1998).
126. Transunion Corp. v. Pepsico, Inc., 811 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1998).
127. See Capita Currency, 155 F.3d at 609. Finally, the unreported Ninth Circuit decision in Mekon v. Oy
Nwtor'AB, 1998 U.S. App. Lexis 22100 (9th Cit. 1998), raises the interesting question of whether forum non
conveniens applies at all to enforcement of awards under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention), implemented at 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1994). The district
court dismissed the action seeking enforcement of a Finnish arbitral award for forum non conveniens reasons.
Because it was not properly raised below, the Ninth Circuit did not pass upon the appellant's contention that
the New York Convention precludes application of the forum non conveniens doctrine. Instead, over a strong
dissent by Judge Tashima, the majority undertook a Gilbert analysis of the lower court's decision and found that
there was no abuse of discretion in the dismissal. Judge Tashima dissented, arguing that the Gilert analysis is
not adequate in cases involving enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. In the dissent's view, consideration of
"practical problems that make the trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive" or of "the burden of jury
duty on the community" (all of which are part of a traditional Giben analysis) are simply inapposite in the context
of the enforcement of a foreign arbitration award.
*Michael M. Ostrove is an associate with Debevoise & Plimpton in Paris, France.
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tion against extraterritoriality, 25 concerns for international law and comity, 9 and an application
of U.S. laws that comports with congressional intent and constitutional limits-even when
such application heads overseas. 3' The analysis set out by the Ninth Circuit in Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank ofAmerica, NT. &S.A., 3' as it has evolved over time,"' has become the
traditional solution to this problem. Under this analysis, courts balance multiple factors in
determining whether a law should apply extraterritorially.'
This past year has brought a steady stream of cases in which the U.S. courts dealt with
these questions. The cases ranged from reviews of the extraterritorial applications of U.S.
antitrust laws in light of recent changes to the Timberlane analysis and considerations of the
domestic conduct required for U.S. securities laws to apply to overseas transactions to findings
regarding the overseas effec't of bankruptcy. injunctions and the recoverability of damages for
extraterritorial acts of copyright infringement.
A. AwrrRus-r-SuBsTscriAL. CLAIM OF TRUE CoNnict INsumcasErr
In Hartford Fire, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of a "true conflict" between
U.S. and foreign law to the comity test used for deciding whether U.S. antitrust laws should
apply to overseas conduct.' 34 Since that decision, federal circuit courts have been unclear as
to whether the basic comity test as, for example, set forth in the Restatement, remains valid,
or whether the entire analysis turns on the ability of a party to comply with regulations of
both the United States and a foreign government. " ' Last year, we noted that the Second
Circuit would have the opportunity to review the appropriateness of a comity balancing test
to extraterritorial applications of the Sherman Act."36 In Filtecb S.A. v. France Teecmm S.A.,"
the court declined to avail itself of this opportunity, although it did clarify the standards in
the Second Circuit for finding a "true conflict" between foreign and U.S. law.
In Fiktecb, the plaintiff claimed that France Telecom's refusal to make available a list of
telephone customers who elect not to have their names appear on marketing lists amounted
to a restraint on trade in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.' The Second Circuit did
128. See EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
129. See The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.IJ. (set. A) No. 10. See also Pnaan-MAm4I Dupuy, DRorr
INTERNATIONAL PuBuc 73-84 (4th ed. 1998) (reviewing limits under international law of states' prescriptive and
enforcement jurisdiction, with particular attention to recent United States sanctions relating to Cuba, Libya, and
Iran).
130. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 813-14 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
131. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 614-15 (9th Cir. 1976).
132. SNe RsrATMwNT (THnas) or FoREIGN RELATIONS §§ 402-403 (1987) [hereinafter R~sr^rATsONar].
133. Relying in part on Thrberane, the Restatement rule is that a state has jurisdiction to prescribe laws
affecting extraterritorial conduct so long as such conduct "has or is intended to have a substantial effect within
its territory." Id. § 402(IXc). Even so, exercise of that jurisdiction must be reasonable, and the reasonableness
factors indude (a) the extent of the domestic effect, (b) the connections between the state and the persons both
engaging in the regulated activity and intended to be protected, (c) the character of the onduct and extent to
which it is regulated elsewhere, (d) the degree to which justified expectations would be protected or hurt, (e) the
importance of the regulation on the international plane, (0 consistency of the regulation with international tradition,
(g) the extent of another state's interest in regulating the conduct, and (h) "the likelihood ofncofi witb ngutations
by another state." Id §§ 403(2Xa)-(h) (emphasis added).
134. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798-99.
135. RrATE M rr, mupra note 133, § 403(2Xa)-(h).
136. Michael Ostrove, Inveoional Litigation; Extramrritsal Appaicsion of US. Law, 32 Irr'L LAw. 223,
236 (1998).
137. Filetech S.A. v. France Telecom S.A., 157 F.3d 922 (2d Cir. 1998).
138. 15 U.S.C. § I e setq.
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not fully address the international comity analysis, however. Explaining, in effect, that the
courts' subject matter jurisdiction must be fully addressed before prescriptive jurisdiction can
be analyzed, it noted that the parties hotly disputed whether a factual basis existed for subject
matter jurisdiction under the FSIA and another statute. It remanded the case, therefore, on
the ground that the district court had failed to address the factual disputes concerning its subject
matter jurisdiction prior to determining the applicability of the Sherman Act to the overseas
conduct at issue."" The Second Circuit did, however, disapprove the district court's holding
that a "substantial daim" of a true conflict with French law met the standards set by the
Supreme Court in Hartford Fire. Although the district court had stated the claimed conflict
would go "to the heart of the case" and that French law should be decided by French courts,
the Second Circuit said this was insufficient: "a conflict must be clearly demonstrated' in order
for the conflict to be sufficient to thwart application of the statute to conduct abroad.'
B. DEvELOPMENTs IN THE SEculrrEs CoNTxvr
1. Seventh Circuit Takes Sides in Circuit Split
Last year, it was noted that the Fifth Circuit had joined the Second and D.C. Circuits
regarding the extent of domestic conduct required to bring a securities fraud daim in relation
to an otherwise foreign transaction.' 4' Absent a requisite U.S. effect, these courts require that
fraud claims under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-Y of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 be
grounded in domestic conduct "of material importance to" or having "directly caused" the
fraud. 42 In Kauthar SDN BHD v. Steinberg,14' the Seventh Circuit joined these courts when
it rejected the more lenient approach taken by the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits.' 4 The
plaintiff in Kautbar made detailed allegations that the defendants had launched a fraudulent
scheme, prepared the materials for use in that scheme, used the U.S. mail to send those materials,
and received payment, all in the United States. The court held these claims to be "sufficient
to bring the alleged conduct within the ambit of the [U.S.] securities laws."'
141
2. Additional Limitation in the Second Circuit
This past year the Second Circuit drew a further limitation on the extraterritorial application
of U.S. securities laws based on domestic conduct. In Europe d Overseas Commodity Traders,
S.A. V. Banque Paribas London, 1 the Second Circuit agreed with the plaintiff that a series of
phone calls between London and Florida, during which the central alleged misrepresentations
139. See Fiktecb, 157 F.3d at 931-32.
140. Id. (emphasis added).
141. Ostrove, supra note 136, at 236.
142. See, e.g., Robinson v. TCI/U.S. West Communications Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 905-06 (5th Cir. 1997).
143. Kauthar SDN BHD v. Steinberg, 149 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1998).
144. The Seventh Circuit made a further distinction in the circuit split by noting that the D.C. Circuit "appears
to require that the domestic conduct at issue must itself constitute a securities violation." Id. at 665. It therefore
daimed to join the "midground ... identified by the Second and Fifth Circuits," between the position of the
D.C. Circuit and that of the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. I at 667.
145. ld Although the Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court's jurisdictional holding in this regard,
it upheld dismissal of the case because the plaintiff had waived its appeal rights with regard to most of the district
court's alternative grounds for dismissal by failing to address them in its opening brief.
146. Europe & Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London, 147 F. 3d 118 (2d Cir. 1998),
par/on for mrt. fild, 67 U.S.L.W. 3351 (U.S. Oct. 30, 1998) (No. 98-723), 67 U.S.L.W. 3394 (U.S. Dec. 4,
1998) (No. 98-923).
VOL. 3 3, NO. 2
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND DISPUTES 421
were made, "ordinarily would be sufficient to support jurisdiction" over the daims.147 Neverthe-
less, because the plaintiff and defendant companies and individuals involved were not U.S.
entities or citizens, and because the securities were not traded on a U.S. exchange, the court
hdd that "without some additional factor tipping the scales in favor of our jurisdiction ...
the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction by Congress would be unreasonable within the meaning
of the [RStatement]."1 8
C. BANKRuTrcy
The Ninth Circuit addressed issues of both prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction in the
bankruptcy context in In re Simon. ' In Simon, a personal bankruptcy proceeding under Chapter
7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation
filed a proof of claim with the court relating to its S 37 million share of a $200 million syndicated
bank loan apparently made in Hong Kong to Simon. It did not file a proof of claim relating
to a $24 million personal guarantee the debtor had granted it in connection with a separate
Hong Kong loan. The debtor listed that guarantee in his bankruptcy schedules, and the bank-
ruptcy court discharged all of his debts and enjoined creditors from seeking to collect them.
The bank sought an order that the injunction and discharge did not apply to its efforts to
collect on the guarantee in Hong Kong (or that, if it did, it be modified) and that it would
not be subject to sanctions in the United States for commencing collection proceedings in Hong
Kong. The Ninth Circuit rebuffed the bank. Joining other courts to have considered the question,
it held that Congress dearly expressed its intent that the in rem jurisdiction over the bankruptcy
estate incorporates a fiction that the estate is, as a matter of law, entirely within the district
in which the bankruptcy court sits-regardless of where the estate's assets and liabilities actually
are found."' The discharge and injunction, applying to this estate, were held to be effective
throughout the world.
Because the bank had participated in the U.S. bankruptcy proceedings, the Ninth Circuit
did not need to address in detail whether its enforcement jurisdiction allowed it to enjoin a
foreign bank from bringing a foreign collection proceeding. Its effective enforcement mechanism
was simpler. The court held that because the bank had participated in the U.S. bankruptcy
proceeding, it was subject to sanctions in the United States (where it has substantial assets) for
any collection efforts in Hong Kong."
D. CoPYRIGHT-DAMAGES FOR EXTRATERRITORIAL INFRINGEMENT
The Ninth Circuit joined the Second Circuit in 1998 in permitting damages for extraterritorial
conduct to be recovered under the Copyright Act."' Defendants in Los Angele News Serviw
v. Reuters Television International"' had made unauthorized copies of plaintiffs video of the
147. Id. at 129.
148. Id.
149. In re Simon, 153 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 1998), petionfor am. fid, 67 U.S.L.W. 3376 (U.S. Nov. 25,
1998) (No. 98-869).
150. Id. at 996. The Ninth Circuit particularly relied on the Seventh Circuit's recent decision in Underwood
v. Hi/iard (n re Rirnsat, Ltd.), 98 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 1996).
151. See id at 997.
152. 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. The Second Circuit cases on this subject go back to Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn
Piaures Corp., 106 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1939) (L. Hand, J.), affd, 309 U.S. 390 (1940).
153. Los Angeles News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int'l, 149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998), peritionforam.fied,
67 U.S.L.W. 3376 (U.S. Nov. 23, 1998) (No. 98-851).
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infamous beating of Reginald Denny during the April 1992 riots in Los Angeles. Defendants
then provided the footage to their affiliates and subscribers overseas. Confirming prior holdings
that U.S. copyright laws do not apply to extraterritorial acts of infringement, 54 the Ninth
Circuit nevertheless held that the owner of the copyright is entitled to "damages flowing from
exploitation abroad of the domestic acts of infringement."" '
V. Choice of Law in International Litigation
COLIN B. PICKER*
A. Lax FORI APPLIES TO LEGAL FEEs CLAIM
In Arno v. Club Med Boutique Inc.,16 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that
California law, the law of the forum, should apply to the plaintiffs claim for legal fees arising
out of an action involving sexual harassment by a supervisor at a resort in France. In the
substantive portion of the suit, the court determined that French law applied, but was confronted
with which law would apply to the later claim for legal fees. The plaintiff argued that the law
that had been applied in resolving the underlying dispute should apply (French law). The
defendants argued, and the court ultimately agreed, that the local law (California law) should
apply. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on two lines of reasoning: if the fees issue
is procedural, the law of the forum applies; if the fees issue is substantive, then the court must
embark on a substantive choice of law analysis. The court just noted that California decisions
had found the award of attorney's fees to be procedural. Then, applying a substantive choice
of law analysis, the court determined that France had no interest in extending its laws to apply
to the fee issue because the French fee statute was designed as a procedural mechanism, not
a substantive one (as, according to the court, is the British fee arrangement). California, in
contrast, has a strong "interest" in having its laws apply. Accordingly, the court applied California
law, with its "American Rule" that each side must pay its own legal fees, and denied legal
fees to the plaintiff."'
B. CouRTs OF APPEAis How ANTi-wAIVER PROVISIONS OF SEcURrrES LAws Do Nor APPLY
TO CHOICE OF LAW AND FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES
As discussed in Part III above, three U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals recently joined six other
circuit courts in holding that the provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 prohibiting contractual waiver of U.S. securities laws do not void choice
of law and forum selection clauses in an international transaction." 8
154. See id at 990-91.
155. Id. at 992.
*Coin B. Picker is an associate with Wilmer Cutler & Pickering in Washington, D.C.
156. Amo v. Oub Med Boutique Inc., 134 F.3d 1424 (9th Cir. 1998).
157. Id. at 1425.
158. See Richards v. Uoyd's of London, 135 F.3d 1289(9th Cir.) (en banc); Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd's
London, 148 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1998) (joining the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuit
Courts of Appeals); and Stamm v. Barclays Bank of New York, 153 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 1998) (reaffirming an
earlier similar holding).
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C. FEDERAL COMMON LAW APPLIED TO VICTIM OF OvERsEAs TERRO RLS Bo13
In Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran,"' the D.C. District Court applied "interstitial federal
common law" to an action against Iran brought under the recent terrorism exception to the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The wrongful death action against Iran was brought
by the estate of an American student killed in a suicide bomber attack on a Tourist bus in
the Gaza Strip. The estate claimed that Iran had financed the terrorist organization responsible
for the attack. Iran never appeared in the district court and the court entered a multi-million
dollar default judgment against Iran.
Among other issues before it, the court was faced with an international choice of law problem.
Normally, the law of the place where the tort occurred applies. In the case before it, however, the
court determined that working with the unfamiliar Gaza legal code would present administrative
difficulties. Moreover, the court determined that the United States had significantly greater
interest in having its law applied than did the Palestinian Authority. Not only did the United
States have an interest in adjudicating the wrongful death of a U.S. citizen, but it also had an
interest in fulfilling the congressional intent, reflected in the antiterrorism exception to the
FSIA, that the federal courts create coherent national standards to support the act's initiative
against state-sponsored terrorism.
D. CHOICE OF LAw CLAUSE NOT APPLICABLE TO ARBITRABILITY OF CLAIMS
In Westbrook Inte ntiong LLC v. Westbrook Technologies, Inc.'6o a district court addressed
whether a choice of law clause specifying the law of Ontario, Canada controlled the court's
enforcement of the contract's arbitration clause. Application of Ontario law, according to the
defendant, would mean that the claims were not arbitrable. Conversely, the plaintiff argued
that the U.S. Arbitration Act applied and mandated arbitration. The court determined that
the choice of law clause applied to the rights and duties of the parties, while the arbitration
clause addressed arbitration. Accordingly, the court held that absent a dear intent of the parties
to apply other law to the arbitration clause, the arbitrability of the contract was a matter of
federal substantive law.
The court noted that its holding was consistent with the relevant international law-the
New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. The
convention, in relevant part, provides that a "court of a Contracting State ... shall ... refer
the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the [arbitration] agreement is null and void,
inoperative, or incapable of being performed."' 6' Accordingly, after determining that the arbitra-
tion agreement contract was not null and void or incapable of operation, and because the
United States and Canada are both signatories, the court held that under international law the
matter must be referred to arbitration.
E. CHOICE OF LAw IN CoPYRIGHT ACTIONS
In Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc.,"' the Second Circuit undertook
a rare examination of choice of law in the copyright context. The case centered around a suit
against Kurier, a New York-based Russian language weekly newspaper, by Russian newspapers,
159. Flatow v. Iran, 999 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1998).
160. Westbrook Int'l, LLC v. Westbrook Tech., Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 681 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
161. New York Convention on Recognition & Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. If.
162. Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1998).
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magazines, Russian news agencies, and the Union ofJournalists of Russia. The plaintiffs claimed
that the defendant illegally copied about 500 of the plaintiffs' articles without permission.
Neither the parties nor the district court addressed the choice of law issue. Rather, they all
assumed that Russian law applied and debated exactly how Russian law dealt with the issues
before them. Plaintiffs achieved measured success (some damages and an injunction against the
defendant) in the district court. On appeal, the court of appeals asked the parties to address
the choice of law issue. In addition, to help it with this difficult and rarely covered aspect of
choice of law, the court requested Professor William Patry to submit a brief as amicus curiae.
The choice of law issue presented was which country's law applies to copyright ownership
and which applies to copyright infringement. The appellate court's analysis of the conflicts issue
began with a determination that the U.S. Act implementing the Berne Copyright Convention did
not supplant existing U.S. copyright protection, the Copyright Acts. However, that act did
not itself contain provisions relevant to the issues that were before the court. Accordingly, the
court stated that it would "fill the interstices of the Act by developing federal common law
on the conflicts issue... [and in doing so, the court is] entitled to consider and apply principles
of private international law..."16'
The court then separated the discussion of the copyright issue into the issue of copyright
ownership and copyright infringement. For the ownership issue, the court applied the usual
rule for property-that property interests are determined according to the law of the state with
the most significant relationship to the property and the parties. Finding that the works were
created by Russian nationals and first published in Russia, the court determined that Russian
law should apply and that the Berne Convention suggested nothing to the contrary.
With respect to the infringement issues, the court applied the usual rule for torts-kx ld
delii. Because the infringement occurred in the United States, the court applied U.S. law to
the infringement issues (it also remarked that to the extent a wider "interests" approach should
be considered, it would still have applied U.S. law inasmuch as the defendant was a U.S.
entity).164
The court ultimately concluded that the Russian newspapers did not, under Russian law,
have any copyright ownership in the text of the articles (although they may have had such
rights in the selection, arrangement, and display of the articles). It remanded the case for further




American procedure regarding international discovery stems from 28 U.S.C. §§ 1781-1783,
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in particular Rule 28(b). The leading case on the
topic of international discovery is the Supreme Court's decision in Sacit Nationak Induwtielk
163. Id. at 90.
164. See id. at 91.
*ChristopherJoseph Borgen is Director of Research and Outreach, the American Society of International Law.
At the time that this piece was written, the author was an associate in the New York office of Debevoise &
Plimpton.
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Aerospatiak v. United States Distria Court."S Many later cases base their reasoning on interpreta-
tions of Aerospatiak.
B. DEFINING PROCEEDINGS BEFoRu FOREIGN TRImUNAIS ENTrrLED TO Am
1. Second Circuit Finds That Private Commercial Arbitrations Are Not Foreign
or International Tribunals
In NBC v. Bear Stearns 6& Co.,"I the Second Circuit held that a private commercial arbitration
was not a "foreign or international tribunal" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1782. At issue was
whether section 1782 empowered U.S. courts to compel third parties not bound by the arbitra-
tion contract in question to respond to subpoenas issued in relation to the arbitration. The
Second Circuit began by noting that "foreign or international tribunals" is undefined in the
statute, and thus "is to be given its plain or natural meaning." '167 Although finding the term's
plain meaning to be broad enough to include both state-sponsored and private tribunals, the
court concluded that reference to the statute's context was necessary to determine Congress'
intent.'"" Reviewing the legislative history, the Second Circuit concluded that the term "tribu-
nals" was only meant to refer to conventional courts, intergovernmental arbitral tribunals, and
other state-sponsored adjudicatory bodies. 6' Moreover, construing section 1782 to include
private commercial arbitrations would be "in stark contrast" to the limited evidence gathering
capabilities of domestic arbitrations under the Federal Arbitration Act, would undermine the
efficiency and cost effectiveness of international arbitration, and "thus arguably conflict with
the strong federal policy favoring arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution
... [and] would create an entirely new category of disputes concerning the appointment of
arbitrators and the characterization of arbitral panels as domestic, foreign, or international."' 70
2. Second Circuit Parses Definition of Foreign Tribunal
In Euromaepa S.A. v. Emerian,'7' the Second Circuit found that neither a pending French
bankruptcy proceeding following a final judgment by the French Supreme Court, nor a potential
motion to reopen the judgment of the French Court of Appeal, met section 1782's requirement
that the discovery sought be for use in a "foreign tribunal." As in prior such decisions, the
Second Circuit focused its analysis "on two questions: (1) whether a foreign proceeding is
adjudicative in nature; and (2) when there is actually a foreign proceeding.""' The Euromepa
court reasoned that, while there may be bankruptcy proceedings that constitute adjudicative
proceedings for the purpose of section 1 782,7'3 in the instant case the merits had already been
adjudicated and the bankruptcy proceeding existed merely to enforce a pre-existing judgment,
and thus was not adjudicative. 174
Regarding the issue of whether there is actually a foreign proceeding-the issue ofpendency-
the Second Circuit found that "a proceeding need not actually be pending, but rather that a
165. Soci&ti Nationale Industielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
166. NBC v. Bear Steams & Co., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 933 (2d Cir. Jan. 26, 1999).
167. NBC, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 933 at *It.
168. Seid at *12-*13.
169. Seeid at *14-*20.
170. Id at *22 (citations omitted).
171. Euromepa S.A. v. Esmerian, 154 F.3d. 24 (2d Cir. 1998).
172. Id. at 27.
173. Se id at 28, citing Lancaster Factoring Co. v. Mangone, 90 F.3d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 1996).
174. See In re Letters Rogatory, 385 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1967).
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proceeding must be 'imminent-very likely to occur and very soon to occur.' " The Euromepa
court concluded that the argument that discovery could be used regarding a potential reopening
of the case was "meritless," since "Section 1782 is designed to provide discovery in aid of
foreign litigation, not to provide discovery to justify the reopening of already completed foreign
litigation.''17
C. DiscovERY FOR PROCEEDINGS BEFORE FOREIGN OR INTERNATIONAL TRIEUNALS
1. Third Circuit Does Not Find a Discoverabiity Requirement in Ordering Discovery Related to a
Proceeding Before a Foreign Tribunal
In In re Bayer AG, 77 the Third Circuit held that a petitioner for discovery under section
1782 did not need first to seek a ruling from a foreign tribunal on whether the discovery was
permissible. The district court had denied Bayer's application for discovery because Bayer had
not first obtained a ruling from the judge in the underlying Spanish proceeding as to whether
the requested information was relevant. Reviewing the Third Circuit's previous decision in
Jobn Deere Ltd v. Sperry Corp., 71 the Bayer court stated that the Jobn Deere court "held that
neither reciprocity nor admissibility were controlling concerns under § 1782(a).'1 79 If Congress
had chosen to include a requirement of discoverability, it would have done so explicitly.
Importantly, the Bayer court found that granting discovery where it would not be available
in a foreign jurisdiction would not lead other nations to perceive the United States as holding
their laws in contempt.'° In addressing the argument that Bayer could have gone to the Spanish
court first in its attempt to obtain discovery, the Third Circuit stated that this would impose
a " 'quasi-exhaustion requirement' [that] ... has been rejected by those courts that have
addressed it."1'
2. Soutern District of New York Clarifies Procedures of International Judiaal Assistance
In two decisions in In re Letters Rogatory from Caracas, Venezuela, S.A., Concerning Cecilia
Matos," 2 a New York federal court considered various issues related to international judicial
assistance in response to letters rogatory. The letters were issued by a Venezuelan court asking
the U.S. Department of Justice to gather certain evidence regarding Carlos Andres Perez and
Cecilia Matos, his alleged common-law wife. The district court, on petition from the Department
of Justice, appointed a commissioner to oversee the gathering of evidence. The commissioner
subpoenaed Matos to testify, and Matos moved to quash.
175. Euromepa, 154 F.3dat 27, quoting In re IntemationalJudicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) ofthe Federative
Republic of Brazil, 936 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir. 1991).
176. Id at 29.
177. In re Bayer AG, 146 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 1998).
178. John Deere Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 754 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1985).
179. Bayer, 146 F.3d at 192. The Bayer court found the application of lon Deere by the district court for
the proposition that there is a discoverability requirement "understandable" because at least two previous courts
of appeal had come to similar conclusions. See In re Asta Medica, S.A., 981 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1992); In re
Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad & Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1156 (11 th Cir.
1988). The court noted, however, that "(i]n contrast, the Second Circuit read Joln Deere as we do ... [t]hat
court said insightfully 'lohn De is not a case about whether section 1782 requires discoverability, and the court
never explicitly states such a requirement exists.' " Bayer, 146 F.3d at 192 citing In re Gianoli Aldunate, 3 F.3d
54, 60 (2d Cir. 1993).
180. Bayer, 146 F.3d at 194.
181. Id at 195-96, citing In re Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1992).
182. In re Letters Rogatory, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 14, 1998) and 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2755 (S.D.N.Y., filed Mar. 11, 1998).
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Finding that the letters could not fairly be read to include the Matos subpoena, the court
quashed the subpoena, stating that "the scope of the commissioner's authority to gather evidence
must be found in the text of the [letters rogatory] or it cannot be found at all.''. Furthermore,
the court found it unlikely that a Venezuelan court would order such a deposition in light of
the Venezuelan constitutional protections regarding self-incrimination and spousal privileges.
In the second decision,'" the .court denied Matos' motion to bar transmission of a transcript
of a deposition of a non-party that had been conducted not only by the commissioner, but
by a member of the Venezuelan consulate as well. According to Matos, the Inter-American
Convention on Letters Rogatory forbade consular officials from performing acts involving
compulsion, and the questioning of the deponent by the consular official constituted the unli-
censed practice of law. The court stated that it was doubtful that either Matos or the non-party
deponent had standing to claim a violation of the treaty, as the treaty "creates rights in the
signatory states, not in any individual or group."'' Moreover, the court believed the facts did
not support the contention that the consular official used compulsion in any way as he merely
posed questions, and where the deponent was directed to answer, the direction came from
the commissioner. In any case, the court found that the treaty provides that consular or
diplomatic agents may take evidence and obtain information, and that under the Supremacy
Clause, the treaty provision superseded any licensing requirement under New York law.
186
3. Pntikge Under Hague Evidence Convention
At issue in In re Letters Rogatory from the Local Court of Plon, Germany"' was whether the
respondent could be compelled by a Michigan federal court to produce a blood sample to
establish paternity upon request made by the Local Court of Plon, Germany in a letter rogatory
where Michigan law would not require such a blood sample under the circumstances. The
court assessed whether article 11 of the Hague Convention' s was implicated by the Michigan
law. The court agreed with the government that "[t]he fact that Michigan courts would not
require a putative father to produce blood samples, once he acknowledges paternity, does not
prove that such a test be precluded."'' Simply stating that a blood sample would not be
required under Michigan law did not constitute a privilege or duty to refuse.
D. DiscovEtv FOR PROCEEDINGS BEOioR U.S. CourTs
1. Trial Court Addresses Use of Hague Convention Before New York State Courts
In Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubisbi, Ltd. v. Kvaerner a.s.,'90 a New York state trial court considered the
relationship of the Hague Convention to state discovery rules and, echoing federal jurisprudence,
found that "Hague Convention procedures are not required so long as the discovery takes
183. Id at "6.
184. See id
185. Id at *3.
186. See id. at *5, citing Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory, arts. 2 and 13.
187. In re Letters Rogatory, 29 F. Supp. 2d 776, 1998 WL 884465 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 27, 1998).
188. Stating, "[i]n the execution of a letter of request, the person concerned may refuse to give evidence in so
far as he has a privilege or duty to refuse to give evidence... (a) under the law of the State ofexecution..." Hague
Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, art. 11, 23 U.S.T. 2555,
T.I.A.S. No. 7444.
189. Lern Rogatmy, 1998 WL 884465 at *3 (internal quotation omitted).
190. Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd. v. Kvaemer a.s., 175 Misc.2d 408, 671 N.Y.S.2d 902 (Sup. Ct., N.Y.
Co. Jan. 15, 1998).
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place within the United States and is in no way offensive to the principles of international
comity."191
2. Second Circuit Finds Broad Ability to Serve Partnersbips and No Mandatory Primacy of
Hague Convention in Document Discovery
This past year there were a series of decisions in relation to First American Corporation v.
Price Waterhouse LLP, of which two are of particular note as concerns discovery of foreign
non-parties through subpoenas under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45.
On appeal in First American Corp. v. Price Waterbouse LLP,"' the Second Circuit found that
under New York law, a document subpoena can be served on a non-New York partnership
by personal process on any partner who happens to be within New York: "If valid service is
effected on any partner within the state, personal jurisdiction over the partnership is achieved."' 93
Regarding whether a British court should first decide on the propriety of the requested disclosure,
the Second Circuit was not persuaded by arguments that First American should be compelled
to resort first to the Hague Convention in relation to demands of non-party witnesses. The
Second Circuit found comity analysis to be more applicable, and it also found that the district
court had done what comity requires in using the Minpeco factors to gauge the reasonableness
of the discovery request, 94 If the British courts prohibited Price Waterhouse U.K. from disclosing
the subpoenaed documents, the company could seek exemption from sanctions under Rule
37. g' Finally, the Second Circuit concluded that the Hague Convention did not offer "a
meaningful avenue of discovery in the present case" since the U.K. only permits pretrial discovery
if each document sought is separately described, which would not be possible in this case. 96
3. Wbere Depositions of Foreign Persons May Be Held
Shortly after the Second Circuit ruling, the district court in First American turned to a
subpoena that purported to command depositions of London-based witnesses in New York.'
97
The foreign non-party argued that Rule 45 forbade compelling a witness to travel more than
100 miles from the place where that person resides, is employed or regularly transacts business
in person to testify as a non-party in a deposition and that enforcement of the subpoena would
violate international comity. The court concluded that the fact that the foreign non-party did
business in New York through an agent was insufficient to permit a deposition in New York;
" 'the place' where [Price Waterhouse U.K.] and its partners and employees 'reside,' are
'employed,' or 'regularly transact[s] business in person' is not New York.""' If, however, the
deposition were to be conducted in England, the subpoena could not be issued from New
York, as Rule 45 contemplated that the subpoena issue from the district in which the witness
was and that district be no more than 100 miles from that witness's residence, employ, or
place in which he or she regularly transacts business.
191. Id. at 410, 671 N.Y.S.2d at 904, citing Wilson v. Lufthansa 108 A.D.2d 393, 397, 489 N.Y.S.2d 575.
192. First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 154 F.3d 16 (2d Cir. 1998).
193. Id. at 19.
194. The Minpeco factors are: (i) the competing interests of the nations whose laws are in conflict; (ii) the
hardship that compliance would impose on the party or witness from whom discovery is sought; (iii) the importance
to the litigation of the information and documents requested; and (iv) the good faith of the party resisting discovery.
Id. at 22, citing Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodiry Servs., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
195. See First Am. Corp., 154 F.3d at 22.
196. Id. at 23.
197. First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 1998 WL 474196 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1998).
198. See id at *6.
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In Tripk Crown America, Inc. v. Biosymnb AG,"9' a Pennsylvania federal court considered
whether Biosynth AG, a foreign corporation with its principal place of business in Staad,
Switzerland, could be ordered to appear for depositions in that district. The court noted that
Swiss law places substantial restrictions on the conduct of discovery.2" Biosynth AG argued
for reliance on the Hague Convention, and that Swiss authorities may allow depositions in
Switzerland for use in a U.S. lawsuit, but provided no details as to the procedures or how
long they might take. The court stated that "It]he burden of demonstrating that use of the
Convention procedures would provide effective discovery is on the proponent of using such
procedures. '2"0 The court concluded that depositions in Switzerland would "entail substantial
time, effort, expense and dday, and would not effectively facilitate the gathering of evidence
in a manner contemplated by the Federal Rules."2 2 Consequently, plaintiff could depose Bio-
synth AG in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, although plaintiff would be required to
reimburse defendant for reasonable travel and lodging costs and the depositions were to be
scheduled to minimize disruption to the operation of Biosynth AG.2°"
Ex Parte Toyokuni & Co., Ltd.2 4 concerned a suit against a kerosene heater manufacturer
over a death allegedly caused by a faulty heater. The administrator of the estate of the deceased
sought to depose representatives of defendant Toyokuni, a Japanese corporation that had no
offices in Alabama or the United States. The Alabama Supreme Court found that since the
plaintiff had made an attempt to suggest a mutually convenient mid-point for the depositions,
such as Los Angeles, but Toyokuni rejected the suggestion, the circuit court had not abused
its discretion in ordering the depositions to take place in Alabama, as opposed to Toyokuni's
offices in Japan, as it was "[flaced with Toyokuni's lack of cooperation."
'
'f
The Alabama Supreme Court did not view Japan as a viable venue for the depositions due
to its strict discovery procedures, especially since "Toyokuni would have access to our more
open discovery methods.""2 6 Moreover, the court perceived a U.S. interest in having the
depositions in Alabama to resolve any discovery conflicts and "in maintaining the integrity of
our judicial system and in exercising the jurisdiction of this state and this nation over persons




The U.S. courts continued to refine the legal principles governing when they may properly
exercise personal jurisdiction over cases involving foreign parties and events. Notable develop-
ments in 1998 focused on jurisdiction over intentional torts by foreign parties and applicable
burden of proof.
199. Triple Crown Am., Inc. v. Biosynth AG, 1998 WL 227886 (E.D. Pa Apr. 30, 1998).
200. See id. at *3
201. See id (citations omitted).
202. See id at *4.
203. See id
204. Ex Pate Toyokuni & Co., Ltd., 715 So.2d 786 (Ala. S. Ct 1998).
205. See d at 789.
206. Sm id
207. See id at 789-90.
*Shelby R. Quast is an associate with Wilmer, Cuder & Pickering in Washington, D.C.
SUMMER 1999
430 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A. FOREIGN STATES ARE NOT "PERSONS" FOR PURPOSE OF DUE PRocEss ANALYSIS
In Flatow v. Iran,2' the estate of a U.S. student killed in a suicide bombing attack in Israel
brought a wrongful death action against Iran and its officials under the state-sponsored terrorism
exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The district court held that a foreign
state is not a person for purposes of the due process clause and therefore could not claim a lack
of personal jurisdiction."°s The court reasoned that states of the United States and the federal
government do not have a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause and are not consid-
ered persons for purposes of personal jurisdiction concepts. It concluded that a foreign state is
comparable to a U.S. state or the federal government. The court went on to find that a foreign
state sued for sponsoringterrorist activities rather than engagingin commercial activities will invari-
ably have sufficient contacts with theUnited States to satisfy due process and foundgeneral jurisdic-
tion because of the constant interaction between the United States and foreign officials through
diplomatic and international relations. The court also found fair play and substantial justice to be
well served by the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign states that sponsor terrorism.
B. FOREIGN PARENT COMPANIES ARE SUBJECT TO PERSONAL JURISDCiT1ON BASED ON SALES TO
A U.S. SUBSMARY
In Tomra of Norib America v. Environmental Products Corp.,1° a trade dress infringement
action, the defendant counterclaimed against the plaintiff and its foreign parent corporation.
The foreign parent moved to dismiss the counterclaim, asserting a lack of personal jurisdiction.
The defendant contended that jurisdiction was proper because the foreign parent was (i) the
owner of the trade dress at issue, (ii) the plaintiff/subsidiary was a domestic corporation related
to the parent with its principal place of business in Connecticut and held itself out as licensed
to use the intellectual property rights of the parent throughout the United States, and (iii) the
parent had manufactured all the relevant machines, which the plaintiff/subsidiary exclusively
marketed, sold, and distributed throughout North America. The court first held the foreign
parent to be subject to jurisdiction under a Connecticut statute authorizing jurisdiction by a
Connecticut resident against a foreign corporation on a claim arising from the manufacture,
production, or distribution of goods when the foreign corporation had a reasonable expectation
that the goods would be used in the state. The court next decided that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction comported with the Due Process Clause. Citing the Supreme Court's decisions in
World-Wide Volkswagen and Asabi, the court held that the foreign parent, as the largest manufac-
turer of the relevant machines sold in the United States, all of which were sold through
its Connecticut subsidiary, reasonably should have anticipated that is products would reach
Connecticut on a regular basis. Finally, exercising jurisdiction was reasonable because the ma-
chines were distributed in Connecticut, the foreign parent's subsidiary and the defendant had
places of business there, and many of the witnesses and documents were there.
C. CIRcurrs REFINE THE "REASONABLENESS" COMPONENT OF DUE PROCESS
OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Insurance Co."' was an insurance coverage dispute between
OMI and two foreign insurers. The insurers moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction
208. Flatow v. Iran, 999 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1998).
209. The FSIA itself provides that, where subject-matter jurisdiction under the FSIA exists, "[plersonal jurisdic-
tion over a foreign state shall exist." 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (1998).
210. Tomra of N. Am. v. Environmental Prods. Corp., 4 F. Supp.2d 90 (D. Conn. 1998).
211. OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co., 149 F.3d 1086 (10th Cir. 1998).
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on the ground that they did not have sufficient contacts with Kansas. The court began by
adopting the First Circuit's sliding scale approach to the interplay of the minimum contacts
and reasonableness elements of the due process analysis: depending on the strength of the
minimum contacts showing, a greater or lesser showing on the reasonableness factors needs
to be made.
One of the main issues in the case was whether a clause in an insurance policy stating that
the insurer would defend certain claims against the insured in any U.S. court establishes minimum
contacts with all the courts covered by the clause. The court observed that this issue had been
the subject of conflicting decisions in other circuits. After reviewing the other decisions, the
court decided that such "territory of coverage clauses" creates a contact with the forum state
that is "quantitatively low on the due process scale" but that satisfies the minimum contacts
requirements.
The court then determined that exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable. It found the
burdens on the insurers of litigating in Kansas to be significant because they were Canadian
companies that issued a policy to another Canadian company and had no offices or agents in
Kansas. The interests of Kansas were slight because the plaintiff, the insurers, and the dispute
had little to do with Kansas, and the parties could obtain convenient relief in another forum.
The Sixth Circuit held that Canadian defendants are less burdened by defending suits in the
United States than other foreign defendants. In Aistecb Chemical Ltd. v. Actylic Fabricators
Ltd,2 '2 the defendant, an Ontario, Canada company with its primary place of business there,
had purchased acrylic from the plaintiff in Kentucky and then failed to pay. The plaintiff sued
in Kentucky. The Canadian defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, but
conceded that it had availed itself of the privilege of acting in Kentucky and that the cause of
action was Kentucky-based. The court found that exercising jurisdiction over the defendant
would be reasonable. The court held that a Canadian defendant bears a substantially lighter
burden than most other foreign defendants in defending suit in the United States because both
the U.S. and the Canadian judicial systems are rooted in the same common law traditions and
because of the proximity of Canada to the United States. The court also found the case not
to implicate the procedural and substantive policies of Canada so as to counsel against the
exercise of personal jurisdiction.
D. APPLICATION OF Calder v. Jow to Transnational Cases
In Calder, a defamation case, the Supreme Court found personal jurisdiction to be proper
over nonresident defendants where (i) an intentional tort was committed outside the forum,
(ii) the forum was the focal point of the harm suffered by the plaintiff as a result of that
tort, and (iii) the forum was the focal point of the tortious activity in the sense that the
tort was "expressly aimed" at the forum.213 When applying Calder outside the defamation
context, the circuits have disagreed as to whether the case supports personal jurisdiction
wherever the effects of an intentional tort are felt. The Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits view Calder as requiring more than a mere allegation that the plaintiff feels
the effect of the defendant's tortious conduct in the forum.214 The Seventh Circuit, by
212. Aristech Chem. Ltd. v. Acrylic Fabricators Ltd., 138 F.3d 624 (6th Cir. 1988)
213. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
214. See, e.g., Far West Capital, Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071 (10th Cir. 1995) (Calder does not set forth a
per se rule that an allegation of an intentional business tort alone is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction in
the forum where the plaintiff resides); Southmark Corp. v. Life Investors Inc., 851 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1988)
(Calder does not support jurisdiction where there was no evidence that defendant expressly aimed its allegedly
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contrast, interpreted Calder as holding that jurisdiction may properly be exercised in the
state where the injury occurred.' 5"
In Imo Industries v. Kiekert,216 the Third Circuit applied Calder for the first time to a business
tort. In this case, Imo, a multinational corporation based in New Jersey, sued a German
corporation for tortiously interfering with its attempt to sell its wholly-owned Italian subsidiary
to a French corporation. The court declined to follow the Seventh Circuit, finding its interpreta-
tion of Calder too broad, and opted instead to follow the majority's more conservative reading
of Calder. The court articulated its own three-prong test that a plaintiff must meet for Calder
to apply: (1) the defendant must have committed an intentional tort; (2) the plaintiff must
have felt the brunt of the harm caused by that tort in the forum, such that the forum can be
said to be the focal point of the harm suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the tort; and (3)
the defendant must have expressly aimed his tortious conduct at the forum, such that the forum
can be said to be the focal point of the tortious activity.2" Applying this three-prong test to
the facts of this case, 'the court reasoned that personal jurisdiction did not exist because Imo
did not show that the German defendant "expressly aimed" its tortious conduct at New Jersey.
The First Circuit also addressed Ca/ier in Noonan v. Winston Co., 10 a defamation case based
on the unauthorized use of a Massachusetts resident's photograph in a cigarette advertising
campaign in France. The court applied a narrow reading of Calder, finding that jurisdiction
may be properly exercised only when the defendant aimed an act at the forum state, knew
the act would likely have a devastating effect, and knew the injury would be felt in the forum
state. Because the offending advertisement was aimed solely at French consumers and the
defendant was not aware that copies of the magazine bearing the advertisement would end up
in Massachusetts, the court found the plaintiffs showing to be insufficient. The advertisement
appeared in 305 magazines distributed in the forum-not enough to merit a finding that
Massachusetts was the focal point of the action or that the defendant aimed the advertisement
toward Massachusetts. The court concluded that a forum-based injury was not enough to
support jurisdiction: "[tlo find otherwise would inappropriately credit random, isolated, or
fortuitous contacts and negate the reason for the purposeful availment requirement" adopted
in Caider.
19
E. PLANrwF BEARs BURDEN UNDER RULE 4(KX2 )
In United States v. Offihore Marine Ltd., the District Court of the Virgin Islands addressed
the question of which party bears the burden of proving the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction
tortious activities at Texas, or that Texas was the focal point of the tortious conduct); ESAB Group, Inc. v.
Centrucit, Inc., 126 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 1997) (mere knowledge that plaintiff feels impact of tort in his home
state is not enough to satisfy Calder); General Electric Capital Corp. v. Grossman, 991 F.2d 1376 (1st Cir.
1998) (even where effects occurred in forum, Calder does not support jurisdiction where focal point of "alleged
wrongdoing" occurred outside forum); Cybersell Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting
jurisdiction under Calder finding that defendant's website was not aimed intentionally at Arizona knowing that
harm was likely to be caused there).
215. SeeJanmark, Inc. v. Reidy, 132 F.3d 1200 (7th Cit. 1997) (the state where the victim of a tort suffers
injury may entertain a suit against the alleged tortfeaser).
216. Imo Indus. v. Kiekert, 155 F.3d 254 (3d Cit. 1998).
217. Seend. at 256.
218. Noonan v. Winston Co., 135 F.3d 85 (1st Cir.1998).
219. See id. at 91.
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in any state under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(kX2).22° Rule 4(kX2) authorizes the exercise
of personal jurisdiction by federal courts in a federal question case based on contacts with the
nation as a whole, rather than contacts limited to the state of the forum. In a case of first
impression in the Third Circuit, the court held that the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
personal jurisdiction by proving that the defendant is not otherwise subject to service of process
in any state. In this case, the United States brought suit against the defendant, a Netherlands
corporation, charging negligence under the general maritime law that caused or contributed
to the sinking of an oil laden barge. Because the United States did not provide information
establishing that the defendant was not subject to personal jurisdiction in any state, the court
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction.
VIII. Service of Process Abroad
PATRICK P. GUNN*
This past year yielded several significant decisions on service of process abroad. Most notably,
the Fourth Circuit and the United States Court of International Trade both provided needed
guidance as to the proper construction of Hague Convention221 provisions allowing for service
abroad by "officials" and "competent persons." In addition, the Utah Supreme Court hdd
that the Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory222 is not the exdusive means of service
between residents of signatory nations.
A. SERVICE UNDER FEDERAL RuLE OF CivIL PROCEDURE 4(F)
In Mayoral-Amy v. BHI Corp.,22 a Florida district court addressed whether to require a pro
se Florida plaintiff to effect service in a manner consistent with the law of Belize, or whether
to craft-without regard to the law of Bdize-its own method of service under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 4(fX3). Plaintiff brought a breach of contract suit against a corporation and
citizens of Belize. After defendants failed to respond to plaintiffs written request that they
waive service requirements, plaintiff faxed them copies of his complaint. Defendants responded
with a motion to dismiss, arguing that the law of Belize did not permit service by facsimile,
but required service by a Belizean attorney or by request to the Supreme Court of Belize.
In testing the sufficiency of service, the court first declined to apply the Hague Convention,
finding that Belize's status as a signatory was "uncertain." Although Belize's predecessor, British
Honduras, was a party to the Hague Convention as a territory of the United Kingdom, "[s]ince
achieving independence, Belize has not become a signatory."224 As a result, the court determined
that service could properly be effected only under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(0(2),
"governing circumstances where there is no internationally agreed means of service," or altema-
220. The text of Fan. R. Cirv. P. 4(lX2) reads:
If the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States,
serving a summons or filing a waiver of service is also effective, with respect to claims arising
under federal law, to establish personal jurisdiction over the person of any defendant who is not
subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction of any state.
*Patrick P. Gunn is an associate with Loeb & Loeb LLP in Los Angeles, California.
221. See Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial
Matters, Feb. 10, 1969, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
222. Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory, Jan. 30, 1975, S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-27, 14 I.L.M.
339 (1984) [hereinafter Inter-American Convention].
223. Mayoral-Amy v. BHI Corp., 180 F.R.D. 456 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
224. See id. at 459 n.2.
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tively, under Rule 4(0(3), which, it found, "allows this Court to authorize any particular method
of service of its own choosing, so long as the order does not contradict any applicable international
agreement.,
225
With some reluctance, the court declined to exercise the authority granted to it by Rule
4(0(3), acknowledging that the provision empowered it to "define a method of service by
which the parties in Belize may be acceptably contacted, regardless of whether or not such
method contravenes Belize's law." ' 6 Looking to the law of Belize, the court concluded that
plaintiffs fax service was defective, denied defendant's motion to dismiss without prejudice,
and directed plaintiff to properly effectuate service within sixty days.
227
B. SERVICE ON COR.POaRATONS DY SERVICE ON SUBSIDIARIES UNDER STATE LAW
In Sankaran v. Club Mediferrank, S.A. ,22' a New York district court determined that, where
foreign corporate defendants were doing business in New York exclusively through their U.S.
subsidiaries, service on those subsidiaries was sufficient to constitute service on the foreign parents.
In Sankaran, plaintiff brought tort claims against several foreign corporations and their wholly-
owned U.S. subsidiaries, Club Med Management Services (CMMS), and Club Med Sales (CMS).
Plaintiff purported to serve the foreign parents through service on their U.S. subsidiaries. While
noting that the mere existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship was not in itself sufficient to
enable plaintiff to effect service in this manner, the court nevertheless determined that other facts
before it supported the conclusion that plaintiff had properly served the foreign parents. 2' The
court found that "plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to show that the non-domiciliary defendants
are doing business in New York through CMS and CMMS, and that these organizations are doing
all the business the non-residents would do were they here by their own officials." The court
concluded that plaintiff had "made a sufficient showing of an agency relationship between the
nonresident defendants and CMS and CMMS to indicate that service of process upon CMS and
CMMS was adequate to give notice to the other defendants.
' 230
C. DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE HAGUE CoNVENTION
1. Service by Mail under Artide 10(a)
A Vermont district court decided, in Taft v. Moreau, " that judicial documents served on
residents of Quebec under article 10(a) of the Hague Convention need not be translated into
French. Though Canada's Instrument of Accession requires that judicial documents served on
residents of Quebec by Canada's Central Authority be translated into French, the court held
that this requirement only applied to judicial documents served pursuant to article 5, which,
"by its terms pertains only to service by the Central Authority or its designated agency, and
imposes no requirements on service under Article 10.,,232 The court did, however, go on to
note that "[s]ervice of process must also satisfy Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
225. See id. at 459.
226. See id. at 458 n.3.
227. See id at 460.
228. Sankaran v. Club Mediterranie, S.A., No. 97 Civ. 8318 (RPP), 1998 WL 433780 (S.D.N.Y. July 31,
1998).
229. See id. at *5.
230. See id.
231. Taft v. Moreau, 177 F.R.D. 201 (D. Vermont 1997).
232. See id. at 204 (citing Lemme v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 456, 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)).
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and constitutional due process," and cautioned that "in some instances a failure to provide a
translation of the document in a language the recipient could understand might be constitution-
ally unreasonable." 2" The court found no such due process concern in its case, however, since
neither of the Quebec defendants claimed lack of notice or an inability to understand the
language of the complaint.234
2. Se vice under Articks 10(b) and 10(c)
Articles 10(b) and 10(c) of the Hague Convention permit sending of requests for service of
process abroad directly to the "judicial officers, officials, or other competent persons" of the
receiving state, provided the receiving state does not object.2" In Koebkr v. Dodwell,23' 6 the
Fourth Circuit considered the meaning of "competent persons" under article 10(c), and held
that this term should not be narrowly construed to mean only employees of the destination
state, but should also include private process servers authorized to effect service under the law
of the destination state.
In Koebkr, defendant Dodwell, a Bermuda resident, had succeeded in vacating a lower court
default judgment entered against him for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff
had served Dodwell by forwarding papers directly from plaintiffs U.S. attorney to a private
process server in Bermuda, who in turn served them on Dodwell. On appeal, plaintiff contended
that he had effectively served Dodwell under article 10(c).
Dodwell did not dispute that plaintiffs attorney was a "person interested in [the] judicial
proceeding" entitled to initiate service under article 10(c), or that the process server hired by
plaintiffs attorney was competent to effect service in Bermuda. Instead, Dodwell argued, inter
alia, that "competent persons of the State of destination," read in the context of article I 0(c)'s
language "judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of destination,"
must refer only to competent persons who are employed by the destination state. The Fourth
Circuit, perhaps somewhat unfairly,2 7 rejected this construction as a "tortured reading" of
the language of article 10(c). The court reasoned that such a restrictive interpretation "simply
does not fit within the context of the liberal service options provided for in the treaty, which
include service by mail."'238 Finding service was effective, and finding Dodwell's other arguments
similarly unpersuasive, the court reversed the lower court's decision vacating the judgment. 39
In United States v. Islip,2" the United States Court of International Trade provided some
guidance as to what types of "officials" and "competent persons" are authorized to effect
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See Hague Convention, supra note 221, art. 10(b) ("Provided the State of destination does not object,
the present Convention shall not interfere with ... the freedom of judicial officers, officials or other competent
persons of the State of origin to effect service of judicial documents directly through the judicial officers, officials
or other competent persons of the State of destination .... "); art. 10(c) ("Provided the State of destination does
not object, the present Convention shall not interfere with ... the freedom of any person interested in a judicial
proceeding to effect service of judicial documents directly through the judicial officers, officials or other competent
persons of the State of destination").
236. Koehler v. Dodwell, 152 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 1998).
237. Se, e.g., GARY B. BoRN & DAVID Wsrrl, INTERNATiONAL CivnL LITIGATION IN UNrrED STATES CouRTs
811 (1989) (noting uncertainty as to the identity of "competent persons" who can be requested to effect service
under article 10(c) of the Hague Convention).
238. See Koebkr, 52 F.3d at 307.
239. Se id
240. United States v. Isp, 18 F. Supp. 2d 1047 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1998).
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service under articles 10(b) and 10(c). In Ish'p, the United States government sued a Canadian
exporter's employee Brown and others to recover civil penalties, alleging false placement of
country-of-origin markings on goods exported from Canada to the United States. The head
of the United States Customs Office of Investigations transmitted the summons and complaint
to the Acting Manager of the regional Canadian Customs Investigations Service along with a
request that the documents be served on defendant Brown. Brown eventually brought motions
to quash service and to dismiss, alleging, inter alia, that service had not properly been effected
under artide 5 of the Hague Convention.
The court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that Brown had waived his challenge
to service by not asserting it in his first responsive pleading.24' It nevertheless went on to reject
defendant's arguments on the merits. The court observed that although service was not effected
under article 5 of the Hague Convention, service might nevertheless still be proper under articles
10(b) and 10(c). The court cited "uncertainty" surrounding the identity of "competent persons"
who can transmit, receive, and serve process papers under articles 10(b) and 10(c), and found
little guidance from commentators on the negotiating history of the Hague Convention. Finally,
the court looked to Canadian Instrument of Accession, which it believed supported an "expansive
interpretation of who is 'competent' to transmit, receive and serve process in Canada under
Articles 10(b) and 10(c).,,1 42 The court also looked to Canadian internal laws and the laws of
Ontario, which were "flexible" and did "not proscribe government officials or even private
persons from effecting service of process.,
243
Guided by these principles, the court went on to analyze the facts at bar. With respect to
article 10(b), the court found that the summons and complaint had been transmitted for service
by a United States customs investigator, who was indisputably a United States "official." These
documents were then transmitted to the "Acting Manager" of a regional Canada customs
investigations office and then to a further Canadian customs "official" for service. "Thus,
service of Defendant was 'directly effected' by and through officials and 'competent persons,'
pursuant to Article 10(b)." 244
As for 10(c), the court first noted that there was "no case authority that sheds light on who
qualifies as a 'person interested in a judicial proceeding.' ,,24 The court nevertheless accepted
the government's argument that the United States customs official who had transmitted the
summons and complaint was sufficiently "interested," inasmuch as his office was in charge of
investigating the alleged fraud underlying the action.2"
3. Additional Signatories to Hague Serice Convention
There were no new signatories to the Hague Convention in 1998.'
D. ALTERNATIVES TO SERVICE UNDER THE INTER-AMERIcAN CoNVENTION
The Utah Supreme Court held in Skantby v. Cakados (Mope S.A.1' that the Inter-American
Convention does not provide the exclusive means of service between residents of signatory
241. See id. at 1053.
242. See id. at 1056.




247. Skanchy v. Calcados Ortope S.A., 952 P.2d 1071 (Utah 1998).
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nations. In Skancby, U.S.-based shoe distributors sued their Brazilian manufacturer Calcados
on promissory estoppel and breach of contract daims. Plaintiffs retained a Brazilian attorney
to serve the complaint and summons upon Calcados in Brazil. Calcados failed to respond to
the complaint and judgment was eventually entered in favor of plaintiffs on the promissory
estoppel claim. Calcados appealed on several grounds, including invalidity of service of process,
arguing that plaintiffs' service failed to comply with the Hague Convention and the Inter-
American Convention.
The court rejected Calcados' argument based on the Hague Convention, observing that
Brazil was not a signatory, and finding that "the Convention cannot apply to any service or
process within a non-signatory nation."' 4 The court also rejected Calcados' argument based
upon the Inter-American Convention. Citing the Fifth Circuit's decision in Krcimerman v.
Casa Veerkamp S.A. de C. V.,241 the court held that letters rogatory, or letters of request, are
"merely one of many procedural mechanisms by which a court in one country may request
authorities in another country to assist the initiating court in its administration of justice.,
250
Accordingly, the Inter-American Convention did not preempt service of process effected under
Utah rules, which allow service of process on foreign corporations to be made by "by delivering
[process] to an officer or a managing general agent. '
21
1
IX. Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
DAvm M. RosENzwsl*
During 1998, the Hague Conference on Private International Law continued its planning
and drafting efforts toward the creation of a Convention on International jurisdiction and the
Effects of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. With meetings of the special
commission charged with drafting the convention scheduled for November 1998 and June
1999, current plans are geared toward an October 2000 adoption of a final text for signature
and ratification. 5 2
Despite this progress toward a multinational convention on enforcement of judgments, signifi-
cant obstacles may make it difficult to agree upon a text that will be acceptable to a substantial
number of nations. Differences among national laws and policies on such issues as acceptable
bases for the exercise of personal jurisdiction and the propriety of punitive, multiple, and other
substantial damages awards will have to be resolved."
Until such time as the United States signs and ratifies a multilateral convention, the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments in the United States will continue to be governed by
federal and state statutes and case law. In the absence of federal legislative activity in 1998,
questions of enforcement continue to rest largely upon the principles of international comity
articulated in the Supreme Court's 1895 decision in Hilton v. Guyot. 54 As of year's end,
248. Id. at 1075.
249. Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp S.A. de C.V., 22 F.3d 634 (5th Cir. 1994).
250. Skamby, 952 P.2d at 1075.
251. Id
*David M. Rosenzweig is an associate with Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP in Los Angeles, California.
252. See Lawrence W. Newman & Michael Burrows, Propoud Hague Comvenion on Judgmnms, N.Y.LJ., Dec.
30, 1998, at 3 (citingletter dated Sept. 1998, fromJeffrey D. Kovar, Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International
Law, to the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Private International Law).
253. See generally Symponum: EnfordngJudgments Abroad The G&obal Cbalnge, 24 BooK. J. INT'L L. I (1998).
254. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
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twenty-nine jurisdictions had adopted some form of the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments
Recognition Act, which codifies the comity-based enforcement analysis.25' A small number of
1998 decisions highlighted some of the potential obstacles to effective enforcement of foreign
judgments.
A. PUBLIC POLICY BArs RECOGNrrION OF BRITISH LmE JuDGMENr
The District of Columbia Circuit, with the assistance of the Maryland Court of Appeals,
addressed whether a British libel judgment should be denied enforcement under the Maryland
Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act on the ground that the "cause of action
on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of the State. '2 5 6 Answering
a question certified to it by the federal court, the Maryland Court of Appeals concluded in
Telnikoff v. Matusevitcb that differences between English and American libel laws rendered
enforcement of the British award contrary to Maryland public policy. 57
In an extensive opinion that analyzed the origins and fundamental principles of United States,
Maryland, and English defamation laws, the Maryland court determined that the plaintiffs
British judgment was based upon standards that failed to conform to several key aspects of
First Amendment and Maryland state precedent regarding defamation actions arising out of
speech published in newspapers. Among the several aspects of English defamation law that the
court found to be incompatible with United States and Maryland defamation principles were:
the lack of any requirement under English law that a defamation plaintiff prove fault on the
part of the defendant, whether simple negligence for a private figure plaintiff or the New York
Times v. Sullivan"' actual malice standard required by the First Amendment in cases involving
matters of public concern or public figure or official plaintiffs; the presumption under English
law that an allegedly defamatory statement is false-and the threat of punitive damages if the
defendant unsuccessfully raises the affirmative defense of truth; and the prohibition imposed
by the House of Lords in this case upon considering the allegedly defamatory statements in
the broader context of the Daily Tekgrapb article and ensuing exchange of letters. 2" The court
noted, finally, that its conclusion that recognition of the English law defamation judgment was
contrary to Maryland public policy was bolstered by the prospect that a contrary result might
lead to forum shopping by defamation plaintiffs, given the comparatively pro-plaintiff bias of
English defamation law and the increasing prevalence of large damage awards in England.2"'
Upon receipt of the answer to its certified question, the D.C. Circuit affirmed a district court
judgment denying enforcement of the British judgment.26
B. FuL. FAITH AND CREDIT NOT EXTENDED TO SISTER STATE JUDGMENT ENFORCING
FOREIGN JUDGMENT
A Texas state court denied an attempt by the holder of a Canadian judgment to circumvent the
comity analysis ordinarily attendant upon obtaining recognition of a foreign country judgment by
obtaining a Louisiana state court judgment enforcing the Canadian judgment and then attempting
255. Unif. Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act, 13 U.L.A. 149, 261.
256. MD. CODE ANN. § 10-704(bX2) (Michie 1974 & Supp. 1995).
257. Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997).
258. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
259. Tenikoff, 702 A.2d at 247-49.
260. See id at 702 A.2d at 250-51.
261. See Telnikoffv. Matusevitch, 159 F.3d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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to enforce the Louisiana judgment in Texas under the less restrictive standards applicable to
the recognition of sister state judgments. In Reading & Bates Camtion Co. v. Baker Energy
Resources Crp. ,262 Reading & Bates obtained a substantial patent infringement judgment against
Baker Energy. In an attempt to collect the Canadian judgment in the United States, Reading
& Bates first obtained a judgment in Louisiana recognizing the Canadian judgment, but was
apparently unable to execute upon the judgment in that state. Accordingly, Reading & Bates
commenced an action in Texas, seeking orders enforcing both the Canadian judgment, on a
direct basis, and the Louisiana judgment that had previously recognized the Canadian judgment.
The court of appeal reversed a lower court decision denying direct recognition of the Canadian
judgment under the Texas Uniform Foreign Country Money Judgment Recognition Act.263
The court affirmed, however, the ruling below that Reading & Bates could not rely upon the
Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause2" and the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judg-
ments Act26' to obtain recognition of the Canadian judgment "through the back door" by
submitting the Louisiana judgment for enforcement.2 6 The court recognized that the enforce-
ment of sister state judgments ordinarily is virtually automatic, subject only to limited exceptions.
Nonetheless, the court noted that there are considerably broader grounds for non-recognition
of a foreign country judgment and conduded that interstate comity must give way when it
would circumvent the right of a Texas court to exercise its discretion to consider Texas public
policy and other elements of the international comity analysis involved in the recognition of
a foreign country judgment.26'
C. BANKaupTrcv CouRTs NEED Norr GwvE Pzraazr'R l. TmAmsNTr TO
FoREIGN JUDGMEN-s
In another case, a federal district court decision provided a reminder that convincing a United
States court to recognize a foreign judgment does not always guarantee full satisfaction to the
holder of the foreign judgment. To the contrary, the District Court for the District of Maryland,
although purporting to give effect to two Dutch judgments, confirmed in In re Travelstead6 8 that
the United States Bankruptcy Code can deprive a litigant of much of the benefit that might other-
wise flow from the recognition of a foreign judgment. Under a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization,
the Dutch judgments were treated as Class 6 unsecured daims against the debtor, raising the possi-
bility that the foreign judgment creditor would receive at best a fraction of the total amount to
be awarded by the Dutch court. The plan also permitted the debtor up to two years in which to
repay certain loans at issue in the Dutch proceedings, notwithstanding an order of the Dutch court
requiring immediate repayment or foredosure upon the collateral for the loans.
On appeal by the judgment creditor from the bankruptcy court's order confirming the plan,
the district court recognized the Dutch judgments but nonetheless permitted their effectiveness
262. Reading & Bates Constr. Co. v. Baker Energy Resources Corp., 976 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998,
no writ).
263. Tax. Crv. PRAC. & REm. CODE ANN. §§ 36.003, 36.005(bX3), (7) (Vernon 1997).
264. See U.S. CONST. Art. IV, § 1.
265. See Tax. Civ. PR.c. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.002 (Vernon 1997). The act, not to be confused with
the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act, addresses the enforcement of judgments of domestic
courts, not those of foreign countries.
266. Reading '- Bates, 976 S.W.2d at 715.
267. See id ("We will not permit a party to dothe a foreign country judgment in the garment of a sister
state's judgment and thereby evade ... our own recognition process.").
268. In re Travelstead, 227 B.R. 638 (D. Md. 1998).
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to be impaired. The district court found that the foreign judgment creditor asserted pre-petition
claims that would be discharged upon confirmation of the plan of reorganization.
69
The judgment creditor contended that the plan violated principles of international comity
by failing to give complete effect to the two Dutch judgments. She argued, first, that the plan's
provision allowing the debtor two years to repay the loans contravened the terms of the first
Dutch judgment, which called for immediate payment or the imposition of forfeiting penalties.
Second, the judgment creditor contended that the classification of her right as an unsecured
claim conflicted with the other Dutch judgment, which required payment according to a schedule
established pursuant to Dutch law. 70
The district court rejected these arguments, however, concluding that, even assuming the
plan conflicted with the Dutch judgments, the bankruptcy court had not abused its discretion
in declining to extend comity. Rather, the existence of conflicts with a foreign judgment "does
not require a court to extend comity, but simply requires its consideration.""' Moreover,
although the bankruptcy court had not refrained from impairing the Dutch judgments in limited
respects, the district court noted that "the Plan defers to the Dutch judgments far more than
it conflicts with them, for it allows the validity of both ... claims against the Debtor to be
determined under Dutch law.
T272
Finally, the district court noted that it was immaterial whether the Dutch court would apply
reciprocal recognition to the elements of the bankruptcy court's judgment that affected the
Dutch judgments. Observing that "the bankruptcy court in confirming the Plan extended comity
to the Dutch judgments in all respects but timing for their payment," the district court noted
that "it would seem just and reasonable that the Dutch courts should to that extent extend
their own comity to these bankruptcy proceedings. ' 2 73 Not content to rely upon the good
will of the Dutch court, however, the district court warned in conclusion that if the judgment
creditor attempted to enforce the Dutch judgments in the Netherlands in a manner that contra-
vened the plan approved by the bankruptcy court, a United States court, "having personal
jurisdiction over her, has the power to remedy her extraterritorial violations of its orders." 274
X. Act of State
KATHERINE BIRMINGHAM W.MORE*
For purposes of international comity and the domestic separation of powers regarding foreign
affairs, the act of state doctrine limits U.S. courts' review of official acts by foreign states in
their own territories. This doctrine has rarely been applied, and even less so after WS. Kirkpatrick
d Co. v. EnVironMetal Tccbtonics Corp.2" strictly limited its use to cases where the court's
decision requires determining the validity of a foreign sovereign act. In one notable development
this year, a federal court in the District of Columbia refused to apply the doctrine to international
terrorist acts by a foreign sovereign. In other cases, the Eleventh Circuit declined to create a
269. See id. at 644 (citing II U.S.C. § 1141(d)(IXA) ("the confirmation of a plan ... discharges the debtor
from any debt that arose before the date of such confirmation")).
270. See id. at 656.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 657.
273. Id
274. Id at 657-58.
*Katherine Birmingham Wilmore is an associate with Debevoise & Plimpton in New York City.
275. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Techtonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
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commercial exception to the act of state doctrine, and the Ninth Circuit applied the doctrine
to bar a decision that would have aided victims of human rights violations but required finding
invalid a dear sovereign act of Switzerland.
A. THE AcT OF STATE DocrRiNE AND VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
In the Unocal decision discussed in last year's survey, a California federal court held that
the act of state doctrine did not preclude review of claims against Burma for torture and forced
labor.276 Similarly, the courts and Congress have deemed the act of state doctrine inapplicable
to actions taken by heads of state for their personal gain or for criminal purposes2. and to
expropriation of personal property in violation of international law.27'
In 1998, international terrorism was added to this growing list of foreign sovereign acts for
which the act of state doctrine is no longer available as a defense. In Flatow v. Islamic Republic
of Iran,27' the District Court for the District of Columbia held that the act of state doctrine
did not bar review of claims against Iran, where plaintiffs daughter was killed in a suicide
bombing by a terrorist group funded exclusively by Iran. Plaintiffs daughter, Alisa Michelle
Flatow, died in 1995 from wounds inflicted by the terrorist bombing of an Israeli bus on which
she was traveling. Plaintiff sued Iran, its Ministry of Information and Security, and several
Iranian government officials, all of whom failed to appear. In a non-jury trial the court found that
Iran sponsored the Shaqaqi faction of the Palestine IslamicJihad, which claimed responsibility for
the bomb killing Ms. Flatow-a fact confirmed by Israeli intelligence.
Because Iran defaulted, the district court addressed all the defenses it considered relevant,
including the act of state doctrine. 90 It held the act of state doctrine inapplicable here, because the
bombing took place outside of Iran, and because "bus bombings and other acts of international
terrorism are not valid acts of state of the type which bar consideration of this case., 2 81 As
the court acknowledged, for purposes of the act of state doctrine "valid" does not necessarily
mean "legal" under U.S. or international law.22 Nevertheless, comparing acts of international
terrorism to political assassinations ordered by foreign states outside their territory, which have
already been held invalid for purposes of the act of state doctrine, the court concluded that
the act of state defense was not available to Iran in this case." 3
B. No CoMMERCIAL ExcEmION TO Acr OF STATE DOCTINE
In Honduras Aircraft Regisuty, Ltd. v. Government of Honduras,284 the Eleventh Circuit re-
manded to the district court for reconsideration the act of state doctrine issue. The lower court
276. See National Coalition Gov't v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 357 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
277. See, e.g., United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1522 (S.D. Fla. 1990), affd 117 F.3d 1206 (1997)
(holding that the illegal acts of former dictator were not official acts unreviewable by U.S. courts); Republic of
Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (same);Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547,
557-58 (5th Cir.1962) (same). See also Roxas v. Marcos, No. 20606, 1998 WL 793451 at "41 (Hawaii Nov.
17, 1998), -nsidrauon pmding (Dec. 7, 1998).
278. See 22 U.S.C. § 2370(eX2) (1994).
279. Flatow v. Iran, 999 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1998).
280. See 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (1994) (default judgment against foreign state may be entered only if "claimant
establishes his claim ... by evidence satisfactory to the court").
281. Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 24.
282. See id
283. See id
284. Honduras Aircraft Registry, Ltd. v. Government of Honduras, 129 F.3d 543 (11th Cir. 1997), rrb'
denied 131 F.3d 157 (11th Cir. 1997).
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had held the act of state doctrine inapplicable under a "perceived commercial exception to the
doctrine." '' However, as the Eleventh Circuit pointed out, "there is no commercial exception






Honduran and Bahamian corporations sued the government of Honduras for breach of their
contract to upgrade the Honduran civil aeronautics program. The district court found subject
matter jurisdiction under the commercial exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA),2"' and found the act of state doctrine inapplicable using the same reasoning. Citing
Kirkpatrick, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that some of the same factors must be evaluated
for deciding FSIA and act of state issues."' Nevertheless, it remanded so that the lower court
might consider all the relevant factors rather than rely on an unrecognized exception to the
act of state doctrine.
C. CLAssIc APPLICATION OF THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
In Credit Suisse v. United States District Court,"8' the Ninth Circuit held that the act of state
doctrine precluded the relief sought by judgment creditors of Ferdinand Marcos, because such
relief would require U.S. courts to declare invalid an official act of Switzerland.
A federal district court in Hawaii awarded nearly two billion dollars in damages to the
plaintiffs in a class action suit against Ferdinand Marcos for violations of human rights.290
However, plaintiffs failed in their efforts to collect on this judgment through levies upon Marcos'
accounts in Swiss banks, because after Marcos was deposed, Switzerland, independently and
then at the request of the Republic of the Philippines, froze all of Marcos' assets."'1 The plaintiffs
then sued the banks directly seeking (1) to enjoin transfer of any Marcos assets, except as
ordered by the district court, and (2) a declaration that the district court's assignment of all
Swiss assets to plaintiffs' counsel for the benefit of plaintiffs is valid and binding on the banks.
A California federal court denied the banks' motion to dismiss, and the banks filed for mandamus
relief.292
The Ninth Circuit issued a writ of mandamus ordering the dismissal of the case under the
act of state doctrine. The court found that issuance of the injunctive or declaratory relief sought
would require a U.S. court to declare invalid Switzerland's previous orders freezing Marcos'
assets and "render nugatory" Switzerland's efforts to assist the Republic of the Philippines by
protecting the Marcos assets.2" 3 Under the Kirkpatrick test, the Ninth Circuit found the Swiss
orders to be an "official act of a foreign sovereign, performed within its own territory," and
thus, inquiry into the validity of those orders would violate the act of state doctrine.94
285. Id at 550.
286. Id. See also WS. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 404-05 (noting that Justice White had proposed a commercial
exception for the act of state doctrine in AifeDunbillofLondon, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695-706
(1976)).
287. For recent developments in the area of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, including more discussion
of the Fatow case, please see supra Part II.
288. See Honduras Ainraft, 129 F.3d at 550.
289. Credit Suisse v. United States Din. Court, 130 F.3d 1342 (9th Cir. 1997).
290. See id. at 1344.
291. See id
292. See id. at 1345.
293. Id. at 1347 (internal quotation omitted).
294. Id (internal quotation omitted).
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